

STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS: CONNECTING THE DOTS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EFFORTS

Dr. Jack D. Kem

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war?

GEN. ERIC K. SHINSEKI: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think –

SEN. LEVIN: How about a range?

GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point – something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground-force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this...

Less than a month after US Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee¹ Operation Iraq Freedom was initiated. General Shinseki had already considered the consequences of the invasion of Iraq based on his experiences in Bosnia a decade earlier; the United States Army would need “several hundred thousand soldiers” in the post-hostilities phase. The invasion of Iraq began on March 20, 2003; a little over six weeks later President Bush landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln in a dramatic carrier landing, welcomed with a “Mission Accomplished” banner in the background. The mission, however, was not accomplished. The larger problem of rebuilding Iraqi society – in what is commonly referred to as “Phase IV” in Operation Iraqi Freedom – requires a nonlinear approach to building the

DRAFT DRAFT

This is pre-release version. The bulk of the content is here. Final edits and sexy formatting isn't done yet.

The days just aren't long enough. Neither are the nights.

¹ Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, February 25, 2003.

SWJ Magazine and the Small Wars Journal are published by Small Wars Journal LLC.

COPYRIGHT © 2007 by Small Wars Journal LLC. Permission is granted to print single copies for personal, non-commercial use. Reprint rights reserved. Use of verbatim excerpts is permitted if consistent with fair use and credit is conspicuously cited to the original author and Small Wars Journal, with a hyperlink provided where practicable.

No FACTUAL STATEMENT should be relied upon without further investigation on your part sufficient to satisfy you in your independent judgment that it is true.

Contact:

comment@smallwarsjournal.com
submit@smallwarsjournal.com

Visit www.smallwarsjournal.com

institutions of society with multiple simultaneous actions among diplomatic, informational, military, and economic realms. As General Shinseki noted, the problems of maintaining a safe and secure environment, ensuring that people are fed, water distributed, and all of the normal responsibilities of stability and reconstruction operations are a massive effort.

Since the end of major combat operations, the efforts in Iraq for stability and reconstruction operations identified a number of major deficiencies in interagency coordination and planning. The transition from the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and finally to the handover to the “new sovereign Iraq” was fraught with a lack of integrated efforts to rebuild Iraq. The interaction between the different instruments of national power in the United States – diplomatic,

informational, military, and economic – were not well coordinated nor considered from the beginning of combat operations in Iraq.

As a result, there has been significant effort within the United States government to address these specific concerns. In the future, stability and reconstruction operations will be considered and undertaken simultaneously with major combat operations, rather than as linear activities that begin after a transition from major combat operations – with the active involvement of the Department of Defense and the Department of State, as well as other governmental and non-governmental organizations. This approach will consider the implications of “winning the peace” simultaneously with the implications of “winning the war.”

One of the major efforts to accomplish “winning the peace” has been a collaborative effort by Department of Defense and the Department of State to develop common tasks and objectives for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. The recently formed Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Department of State has taken the lead to facilitate the interagency coordination necessary for the task list and objectives. This office has the mission “to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.” The Department of Defense has additionally initiated a number of related efforts to coordinate stability and reconstruction operations through the development of doctrinal and organizational approaches “to identify and

implement initiatives to increase capabilities to plan and conduct stability operations in a joint, interagency and multinational context.” This paper will focus on the interagency initiatives and challenges to address the complex issues of “winning the peace” while simultaneously conducting major combat operations.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INITIATIVES: EMBRACING INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Within the military, there have been a number of initiatives that have expanded the concept of warfighting to include interagency considerations and the use of the full range of national instruments of power. These instruments of power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments – are normally referred to as the “DIME.” Naturally, the Department of Defense has considered the “M” in DIME as the predominant instrument to be used in situations such as Iraq. Times are changing... Within the doctrinal manuals of the military, there is a greater emphasis on diplomacy, information, and economic power as instruments that are not only to be used as the first choice, but also to be fully integrated when the military is called upon to respond. This doctrinal change in the approach to the use of military power hearkens back to the military writings of Clausewitz, who understood fully that the military instrument of power – the primary instrument for conducting war – does not act in isolation.

We maintain ... that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise? Do political relations between peoples and between their governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? Is war not just another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.¹

The change in mindset for integrating all of the instruments of power is evident in the greater use of “logical lines of operation” as a planning construct for military planners. The concept of logical lines of operation or logical lines is considered a common construct in stability operations in the US Army’s *Operations* manual. This construct also provides a way to consider nonmilitary instruments of power, while synchronizing activities to achieve the end state. The current Joint Operations doctrine manual (JP 3-0) states that military Joint Force Commanders “pursue attainment of the national strategic end state as sustained combat operations wane by conducting stability operations independently and/or in coordination with indigenous civil, US Government, and multinational organizations.” The manual further states that “operations in the ‘stabilize’ phase ensure the national strategic end state continues to be

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 605.

pursued at the conclusion of sustained combat operations. Several lines of operations may be initiated immediately (e.g., providing humanitarian relief, establishing security, etc).¹ For example, the logical lines of operation that were used in Northern Iraq during the initial stages of stability operations were: Establishment of the Rule of Law; Economic Development/Infrastructure Recovery; Democratic Reform; Combat Operations/Leadership Interdiction; Security Sector Reform; and Information Operations.²

The construct for logical lines of operations is also evolving for stability and reconstruction operations. The basic construct of the “DIME” is still considered, but the military shifts its focus to security, while the diplomatic instrument focuses on governance. Hence, you may see “logical lines of operations” in a stability and reconstruction operations that refers to the four components of Security, Governance, Economic, and Informational instruments or elements of national power. In the case of post-hostilities, the military role shifts from a combat role to a security role, which can be transitioned to indigenous police forces as they become capable.

The concept of “phasing operations” in military planning has also adapted based upon the lessons from Iraq. As late as September 2004 the general construct for phasing military operations consisted of four phases: Deter/engage; Seize Initiative; Decisive Operations; and Transition (the traditional Phase IV). By December 2005, the construct had changed to acknowledge greater interface with other civilian authorities and agencies to consist of six phases: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority.³ The phasing construct also indicates that these actions are characterized by level of effort as opposed to being distinct phases – meaning that all activities (including stabilization and enabling civil authority) are initiated at the beginning of the operation – “winning the peace” begins at the same time as “winning the war.”

¹ United States Department of Defense, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), p. xxiv.

² Jack D. Kem, “The Problem of Phase IV: A Case Study Analysis of Building a Society in Northern Iraq.” *Public Performance and Management Review* 29(2), pp. 217-242.

³ JP 3-0




Figure 1. Joint Phasing Concept

In addition to addressing stability and reconstruction operations in doctrinal manuals, the Department of Defense has also provided directive guidance concerning military support for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 states that stability operations are a “core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support.”¹ Acknowledging stability operations as a “core competency” of the Department of Defense was an explicit response to a recommendation by the Defense Science Board in December 2004.² Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 further states that many of the tasks in stability operations are “best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals” but the U.S. military “shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”³ The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is specifically tasked to coordinate stability and reconstruction operations with the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.⁴ The military departments are also directed to “support interagency requests for personnel and assistance to bolster the capabilities of U.S. Departments and Agencies.”⁵

¹ United States Department of Defense, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR), Department of Defense (DoD) Directive Number 3000.05 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005), p. 2.

² United States Department of Defense, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2004), p. vi.

³ DoD Directive 3000.05, p. 2.

⁴ Ibid., p. 4

⁵ Ibid., p. 11

At the operational or regional level, another initiative has surfaced in the Department of Defense that will facilitate coordination between the different agencies of government. The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) concept is designed as a deployable headquarters to coordinate interagency operations during contingency operations. As a permanent forward deployed headquarters, the membership consists of representatives of from the Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Justice, USAID, Department of Health and Human Services, and Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Treasury. The JIACG assists in post-hostility operations, as well as humanitarian relief, civic assistance, and infrastructure rebuilding.¹ The JIACG serves as a “regional mini-National Security Council” to help coordinate interagency efforts in the region. Although the JIACGs are now just coming into reality, the JIACG at the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii played a critical role in the national response to the tsunami relief efforts in the Pacific region in December 2004.²

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE INITIATIVES: TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY

At the direction of the National Security Council, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This office was created based on the growing realization that the State Department had an increasing role in stabilization and reconstruction efforts throughout the world and needed an agency dedicated to conduct interagency coordination. Ambassador Carlos Pascual was the initial Coordinator for S/CRS; on March 20, 2006, Secretary of State Rice appointed Ambassador John Herbst as the new coordinator. The mission of S/CRS is to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.” The office is expected to truly take the lead for the United States Government with the following core functions:

Core Functions: S/CRS will lead and manage civilian response teams in Washington and the field, identify and plan responses to post-conflict situations, and coordinate USG participation in multilateral operations. S/CRS will engage interagency partners to identify states at risk of instability and focus attention on policies and strategies to prevent or mitigate conflict. S/CRS will coordinate interagency efforts to integrate civilian and military planning, and will provide interagency leadership on: monitoring of potential states in crisis, assessing lessons learned and integrating them into operations and planning, supporting budget requests for capacity-building, recommending resource allocations for a response, developing and managing civilian standby capabilities for deployment, and coordinating with international partners.³

¹ LtCol Harold Van Opdorp, USMC, “The Joint Interagency Coordination Group: The Operationalization of DIME,” Small Wars Journal 2 (July 2005), pp. 2-5, accessed at <http://smallwarsjournal.com>.

² B.F. Griffard, Art Bradshaw, and Kent Hughes Butts, “Disaster Preparedness: Anticipating the Worst-Case Scenario,” Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper 05-05 (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, 2005).

³ United States Department of State (DoS), State Department Fact Sheet, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2005), accessed at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43429.pdf>.

A key component of S/CRS is to get civilian interagency teams, coordinated by the State Department, into post-conflict operations as early as possible. In April 2005, S/CRS completed a key planning document to enable this process by developing the “Reconstruction and Stabilization Essential Tasks” list. The task list was developed using a construct of five technical sectors – similar to the “lines of operation” used by military planners. The technical sectors are: Security; Governance and participation; Humanitarian assistance and social well-being; Economic stabilization and infrastructure; and Justice and reconciliation. In each of these five technical sectors there are essential tasks to be conducted in three different conceptual phases: Initial Response (short-term); Transformation (mid-term); and Fostering Sustainability (long-term).¹

The “Reconstruction and Stabilization Essential Tasks” list was developed as an interagency process; it is obvious that the document is designed to be an over-arching task list for all U.S. Government agencies in a post-combat theater. Although the document does not list responsible agencies for each of the tasks, there are tasks that obviously pertain to specific agencies. For example, under the security technical sector tasks, the goal is to “establish a safe and secure environment.” Specific tasks include “conduct counterinsurgency operations” and “enforce ceasefires,” clearly military tasks. Lessons from Iraq also appear to be learned, with the listing of specific tasks such as “protect and secure strategically important institutions (e.g., government buildings, museums, religious sites, courthouses, communications, etc.).”²

On December 7, 2005, President Bush strengthened the stabilization and reconstruction role of the State Department by issuing a Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) empowering the Secretary of State as the U.S. Government lead for coordinating, planning and implementing reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions before, during, and after conflict or civil strife. The White House statement on the Presidential Directive stated:

The directive establishes that the Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. Depending on the situation, these operations can be conducted with or without U.S. military engagement. When the U.S. military is involved, the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. The United States shall work with other countries and organizations, to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.³

The implementing guidance of the Presidential Directive provided specific actions that would be conducted by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. These included:

¹ United States Department of State (DoS), Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2005), p. iii.

² *Ibid.*, p. I-1 and I-4.

³ White House. Statement on Presidential Directive on U.S. Efforts for Reconstruction and Stabilization. (Washington, DC: White House, 2005), accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051214.html>

- Develop strategies for reconstruction and stabilization activities; provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for R&S operations; ensure program and policy coordination among U.S. Departments and Agencies; lead coordination of reconstruction and stabilization activities and preventative strategies with bilateral partners, international and regional organizations, and nongovernmental and private sector entities.
- Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, develop detailed contingency plans for integrated U.S. reconstruction and stabilization, and provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for an integrated U.S. response.
- Lead U.S. development of a strong civilian response capability; analyze, formulate and recommend authorities, mechanisms and resources for civilian responses in coordination with key interagency implementers such as AID; coordinate R&S budgets among Departments and Agencies; identify lessons learned and integrate them into operational planning by responsible agencies.¹

Shortly after the Presidential Directive was issued, Secretary Condoleezza Rice outlined changes in the State Department that were necessary to support “transformational diplomacy.” Secretary Rice clearly outlined the convergence of post–hostility actions between the State and Defense Departments:

Over the past 15 years, as violent state failure has become a greater global threat, our military has borne a disproportionate share of post–conflict responsibilities because we have not had the standing civilian capability to play our part fully. This was true in Somalia and Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and it is still partially true in Iraq and Afghanistan. These experiences have shown us the need to enhance our ability to work more effectively at the critical intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security...The diplomacy of the 21st century requires better "jointness" too between our soldiers and our civilians, and we are taking additional steps to achieve it. We for decades have positions in our Foreign Service called Political Advisors to Military Forces, affectionately called POLADS, in our business. We station these diplomats where the world of diplomacy intersects the world of military force, but increasingly this intersection is seen in the dusty streets of Fallujah or the tsunami–wrecked coasts of Indonesia. I want American diplomats to eagerly seek our assignments working side–by–side with our men and women in uniform, whether it is in disaster relief in Pakistan or in stabilization missions in Liberia or fighting the illegal drug trade in Latin America.²

¹ United States Department of State (DoS), Fact Sheet, President Issues Directive to Improve the United States’ Capacity to Manage Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts. (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2005), accessed at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/58067.htm>

² United States Department of State (DoS), Speech by Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Georgetown University, Transformational Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2006), accessed at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>.

U.S. NATIONAL INITIATIVES: LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTIONS

Congress and the White House have also pushed for increased interagency integration for post-conflict operations. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was created with bipartisan support in Congress and at the direction of the National Security Council.¹ The initial funding (taken from reprogrammed funds) amounted to only \$17 million, which was barely adequate to hire a minimum staff of 37 (out of the desired 80).²

Congress has also addressed the issue of education and training to enhance interagency coordination. A recent Congressional Research Service report highlights specific language in the Department of Defense Directive 3000.05:

Responding to calls to enhance the ability of the wide variety of participants in stability operations to work together, the directive provides a number of ways to incorporate military personnel and civilians of many backgrounds in education and training courses, including personnel from U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and members of the private sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercises.³

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 (H.R. 1815) addressed the issue of interagency training for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations – in Section 360 of the bill.

Not later than February 1, 2007, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on joint field training and experimentation conducted to address matters relating to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations during fiscal years 2005 and 2006. The report shall include--

- (1) a description of each such joint field training and experimentation event, including a description of the participation of other Federal departments and agencies and of the participation of allied and coalition partners;
- (2) the findings of the Secretary as a result of such joint field training and experimentation; and
- (3) such recommendations as the Secretary considers appropriate in light of such joint field training and experimentation, including recommendations with respect to legislative or administrative action and recommendations for any funding required to implement such action.⁴

¹ State Department Fact Sheet, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).

² John C. Buss, "The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its Interaction with the Department of Defense," Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper 09-05 (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, 2005).

³ Nina M. Serafino, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Office, 2006), p. CRS-7.

⁴ United States Congress (109th, 1st Session), House of Representatives, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, H.R. 1815 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005).

The associated Conference Report for H.R. 1815 recognized that the “Department of Defense has developed and is already executing a program to improve its joint and interagency stability operations planning, exercises, and operational capabilities.” The Conference Report further encourages the Department of Defense to “more fully incorporate other federal departments and agencies, as well as allies and coalition partners.”¹

The Conference Report for H.R. 1815 also addresses the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) by commending the Defense Department’s “active support of and cooperation with S/CRS” and urging the Department of Defense to “continue to deepen its coordination with the Department of State on planning for and participating in post-conflict stability operations and reconstruction effort.”²

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 also has a related provision to interagency cooperation. Although the measure primarily addresses interagency coordination for homeland security, the provision could potentially enhance interagency cooperation for post-conflict stability operations. Section 583 of H.R. 1815 states:

It is the sense of Congress that –

(1) the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, should study the options among public and private educational institution and facilities (including an option of using the National Defense University) for providing strategic-level homeland defense education and related research opportunities to civilian and military leaders from all agencies of government in order to contribute to the development of a common understanding of core homeland defense principles and of effective interagency homeland defense strategies, policies, doctrines, and processes...³

The Executive Branch has also played a significant role in encouraging interagency cooperation for post-conflict stability operations. The most significant contribution has been the establishment (at the direction of the National Security Council) of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the State Department in 2004. President Bush has clearly established the Department of State as the lead agency for reconstruction and stabilization operations by Presidential Directive (NSPD-44).

The recently-issued (March 2006) National Security Strategy specifically addresses post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction:

Once peace has been restored, the hard work of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction must begin. Military involvement may be necessary to stop a bloody conflict, but peace and stability will last only if follow-on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful. The world has found through bitter experience that success often depends on the early establishment of strong local institutions such as effective police forces and a functioning

¹ United States Congress (109th, 1st Session), House of Representatives, Conference Report to Accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, H.R. 1815 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 676.

² Ibid., p. 802.

³ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, H.R. 1815, p. 143.

justice and penal system. This governance capacity is critical to establishing the rule of law and a free market economy, which provide long-term stability and prosperity.

To develop these capabilities, the Administration established a new office in the Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, to plan and execute civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The office draws on all agencies of the government and integrates its activities with our military's efforts. The office will also coordinate United States Government efforts with other governments building similar capabilities (such as the United Kingdom, Canada, the EU, and others), as well as with new international efforts such as the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission.¹

The National Security Strategy also emphasizes the leading role of the Department of State in reconstruction and stabilization operations as part of the “transformational diplomacy” initiative:

... reorient the Department of State towards transformational diplomacy, which promotes effective democracy and responsible sovereignty. Our diplomats must be able to step outside their traditional role to become more involved with the challenges within other societies, helping them directly, channeling assistance, and learning from their experience. This effort will include ... improving our capability to plan for and respond to post-conflict and failed state situations. The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization will integrate all relevant United States Government resources and assets in conducting reconstruction and stabilization operations. This effort must focus on building the security and law enforcement structures that are often the prerequisite for restoring order and ensuring success....²

The National Security Strategy also appears to deemphasize the previous (2002) National Security Strategy concept of preemption acting alone if necessary; even though the current National Security Strategy states that the United States “must be prepared to act alone if necessary,” the strategy also states that “there is little of lasting consequence that we can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of our allies and partners.”³ The use of the military is also deemphasized in the statement “In the cause of ending tyranny and promoting effective democracy, we will employ the full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools at our disposal...”⁴ One can only assume that some of the “other tools” include the military.

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, published by the National Security Council in November 2005, uses a construct that is very similar to the concept of “DIME” and the S/CRS *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks*. In this strategy, three different “tracks” are used for post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations: the Political Track; the Security Track, and the Economic Track. Each of these “tracks” include short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives. The “tracks” are intended to incorporate all of the possible sources of power to

¹ White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2006), p. 16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

be applied in Iraq; the document states “the political, security, and economic tracks incorporates every aspect of American power, with assistance from agencies throughout the federal government, and the involvement of the United Nations, other international organizations, Coalition countries, and other supportive countries and regional states.”¹ The sources of power are applied to eight different broad “pillars” or strategic objectives, a similar construct to the “lines of operations” used by military planners: 1) Defeat the Terrorists and Neutralize the Insurgency; 2) Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance; 3) Help Iraqis Form a National Compact for Democratic Government; 4) Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential Services; 5) Help Iraq Strengthen its Economy; 6) Help Iraq Strengthen the Rule of Law and Promote Civil Rights; 7) Increase International Support for Iraq; and 8) Strengthen Public Understanding of Coalition Efforts and Public Isolation of the Insurgents.²

INTERAGENCY CHALLENGES: PULLING IT ALL TOGETHER

There are a number of disparate actions that are taking place within the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and at the national level designed to foster greater interagency cooperation during post-conflict stability operations. These actions, though notable, still fall short. There remain a number of actions that are still required to ensure the application of the appropriate mix of the instruments of national power for stability operations.

The National Security Strategy identifies the source of conflicts within regions by stating the following:

Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.³

Conflicts among the different players involved in post-conflict stability operations are in many ways similar to the conflicts among regional players. Poor governance or management – for a variety of factors, including inadequate funding and personnel turbulence – is a factor to be concerned with. Competing claims and “tribal rivalries” are a concern when there are dramatic differences in the cultures of the different agencies; there is a prevailing view (at least within the military) that “soldiers are from Mars, and diplomats are from Venus.” Within each department, there is also a natural resistance to change and transformation. Secretary Rice’s desire for diplomats to “eagerly seek... assignments working side-by-side with our men and women in uniform” represents, as she acknowledges, a dramatic departure from the past.

Although there appears to be a convergence in doctrine and the approach to planning stability operations among the interagency players, there is still a lot to be addressed and worked out. The differing terminology illustrates some of these differences: the State

¹ United States National Security Council (NSC), National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 2005), p. 25

² Ibid., pp. 25-26.

³ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 15.

Department uses the term “reconstruction and stabilization”; the Defense Department uses the term “Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations”; the Army recently updated its terminology from “Stability and Support Operations (SASO)” to Stability and Reconstruction Operations (S&RO).” For essentially the same concept, S/CRS uses “technical sectors,” the NSC refers to “tracks,” and the military uses “lines of operation.” While these differences may seem trivial, the terms have precise meanings to each of the different agencies – and it is important to ensure that there is a common language shared by all interagency players.

In spite of these difficulties, there is good reason to be encouraged by the different actions concerning interagency cooperation for post–conflict stability operations. There is bipartisan congressional support for S/CRS and interagency cooperation, and a reasonable expectation that this support will continue into the future. President Bush has clearly established the Secretary of State as the lead for stability operations, and Secretary Rice has made “transformational diplomacy” a key objective for the Department of State. Organizations such as S/CRS and the regional JIACGs are becoming more mature and involved in stability operations, with the full support of all of the interagency players. At the “action officer” level, there is a growing realization that there is a greater need for interagency cooperation, particularly in light of the difficulties in the current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In summary, interagency cooperation for post–conflict stability and reconstruction operations is an evolutionary process to create a complex system. Herbert Simon described complexity in terms of system evolution; complex systems are those systems “made up of a large number of parts that have many interactions.”¹ Simon also described complex hierarchic systems as those systems “composed of interrelated subsystems, each of the latter being in turn hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem.”² The interagency process necessary for post–conflict stability and reconstruction operations requires a system interaction between different hierarchic systems – in particular the Department of State and the Department of Defense. This system will become even more complex as other interagency actors become imbedded into an interactive system designed to accomplish post–conflict stability and reconstruction operations.

As the interagency system evolves, the system should become a complex, self–organizing, adaptive system that “brings order and chaos into a special kind of balance” at the edge of chaos, as M. Mitchell Waldrop describes. New ideas and innovation of this new system should change the status quo, “where even the most entrenched old guard will eventually be overthrown.”³ The challenge for the United States Government is to manage these changes, and to adapt to those changes at the edge of chaos.

¹ Herbert A. Simon, *The Sciences of the Artificial*, third ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 179-184.

² *Ibid.*, 184.

³ W. Mitchell Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1992), pp. 9-10.

Dr. Jack D. Kem is a Supervisory Associate Professor in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. His current research interests include ethics, spirituality, military transformation, and campaign planning. Retiring as a Military Intelligence Colonel in 1998, he served in the United States Army for over 22 years. Dr. Kem is a graduate of the United States Army Command and General Staff College, the United States Air Command and Staff College, the Joint Forces Staff College, and the United States Army War College. He holds a BA from Western Kentucky University, an MPA from Auburn University at Montgomery, and a PhD from North Carolina State University.

WHY DR. JOHNNY WON'T GO TO WAR:

ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.

Once called “the handmaiden of colonialism,” anthropology has had a long, fruitful relationship with various elements of national power, which ended suddenly following the Vietnam War. The strange story of anthropology’s birth as a warfighting discipline, and its sudden plunge into the abyss of postmodernism, is intertwined with the U.S. failure in Vietnam.

– Dr. Montgomery McFate

It is imperative that anthropologists critically evaluate and speak out about the dangers the war on terrorism will present to native and minority populations around the world if the governments managing them and their lands are given a new international legitimacy to repress them as ‘terrorists’.

– Dr. David Price

Anyone who has read Dr. Montgomery McFate’s *Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship* will, inevitably, get a somewhat skewed view of the relationship between Anthropology and the military. This viewpoint will, quite naturally, come out of two subtle misperceptions contained in her article. First, there is a belief that Anthropology was a unified discipline at its start – something that is not true: in fact, what we today call “Anthropology” is an amalgam of different disciplines operating under different philosophical assumptions which developed to serve different interests.¹

The second misperception has to do with how the “military” is seen by many Anthropologists. As with any word, there will be subtly different interpretations by varying audiences. McFate, writing for a military audience, does not explain what the term “military” means for many Anthropologists even though this is crucial to understand the current positions held by many in the field.

If we want to understand the current reactions of many Anthropologists towards working with the military, then we have to look at some of the history and at the nature of the discipline itself and, at the same time, examine how the “military” has been constructed within the discipline of North American Anthropology.

¹ Introductory quotes from:

Montgomery McFate, *Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship* March -April 2005, *Military Review*, 24-38

David Price, *Anthropology Today*, Vol 18(1), February 2002 page 3

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY

The term “Anthropology” literally means “the science of Man” (or “Humanity”). In North America, the discipline of Anthropology stems from three separate points of origin: Jefferson’s original establishment of the discipline in the early 1800’s; Wilson’s development of Ethnography in the 1850’s, and Boas’ recreation of the discipline in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s. All three of these models involved Archaeology, Linguistics, Physical Anthropology and Ethnography, but had different emphases in basic philosophy and goals.¹

For Jefferson, the emphasis was on everything relating to Native Americans, including military intelligence, and was very much in the same vein as the classical military ethnographies of Tacitus.² This led to the institutional formation of the Corps of Discovery, the Bureau of American Ethnography and the founding of the American Ethnological Society. The clear concern of all of these groups was dealing with the immediacy of Native groups in political, military and economic situations as the United States expanded across the continent.

Wilson’s version of Anthropology was somewhat different. Inspired first by history and archaeology, and later by Darwinian evolutionary theory, Wilson simply defined Anthropology as “the natural history of Mankind”.³ Unlike the pragmatic, intelligence-oriented Anthropology of Jefferson, Wilson’s vision was strongly rooted in history, biology and the lived reality of the British Empire. As with later British Social Anthropology, Wilson’s models were aimed at the integration and “enlightening” of “savage” groups, after their conquest – a view that came to be synonymous with the British tradition of “indirect rule.”

The final “founding” of Anthropology in North America can be traced back to the arrival of Franz Boas. Boas, who was trained as a Geographer in Germany, based his re-organization of North American Anthropology on three main points:

1. Wilhelm von Humbolt’s concept of *Volkesgeist* as it was filtered through the philosophy of Dilthey and psychology. This concept combines a study of the cultural history of a people, along with their “psychology” broadly construed.⁴
2. A strong opposition to the unilinear evolutionary theories dominating most 19th century Anthropology, especially when these were combined with eugenics movements. More than anyone else, Boas “created” the concept of Cultural Relativism that dominates most modern Anthropology.

¹ For an excellent discussion of the founding of early Anthropology, see A. Riving Hallowell, The Beginings of Anthropology in America, in “Selected Papers from the American Anthropologist: 1888 – 1920”, Frederica de Laguna (ed.), Row, Peterson & Co., 1976

² See, for example, Alexander F. Chamberlain Thomas Jefferson’s Ethnological Opinions and Activities, *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 9(3), 1907 pp. 499-509

³ Sir Daniel Wilson, “Anthropology”, 1885

⁴ George Stoking, “*Volksgeist* as Method and Ethic”, *History of Anthropology Series*, Vol 8, 1996, University of Wisconsin Press. See especially Franz Boas and the Humboltian Tradition, Matti Bunzl, pp 17-78. See also Regna Darnell, “Invisible Genealogies”, University of Nebraska Press, 2001.

3. A strong belief in going out into the field, collecting all the data it is possible to collect, learning to speak the local language, and living with the group you are studying.

Boas combined very strong methodologies and a sound theoretical basis with a ruthless political outlook in his drive to “professionalize” North American Anthropology – a discipline that he and his students ended up controlling (except for Archaeology), by the end of World War I. This institutional control, coupled with an increasing emphasis on empathizing with the people being studied and tied into the closing of the American Frontier and decreased importance of Anthropology as an intelligence source, led to a total reformatting of the ethics of research.

RESEARCH ETHICS AMONGST ANTHROPOLOGISTS IN NORTH AMERICA

For the culture of American Anthropology, the key event in solidifying its ethical vector is Boas' letter in *The Nation* on December 20, 1919 and his censure by the American Anthropological Association 10 days later.¹ Boas, basing his argument on the moral obligations of a scientist, was by no means a “friend” of the military, and drew stark distinctions between people whose morality grew out of their social roles and those who were “scientists”:

A soldier whose business is murder as a fine art, a diplomat whose calling is based on deception and secretiveness, a politician whose very life consists in compromises with his conscience, a business man whose aim is personal profit within the limits allowed by a lenient law -- such may be excused if they set patriotic deception above common everyday decency and perform services as spies. They merely accept the code of morality to which modern society still conforms. Not so the scientist. The very essence of his life is the service of truth. We all know scientists who in private life do not come up to the standard of truthfulness, but who, nevertheless, would not consciously falsify the results of their researches. It is bad enough if we have to put up with these, because they reveal a lack of strength of character that is liable to distort the results of their work. A person, however, who uses science as a cover for political spying, who demeans himself to pose before a foreign government as an investigator and asks for assistance in his alleged researches in order to carry on, under this cloak, his political machinations, prostitutes science in an unpardonable way and forfeits the right to be classed as a scientist.²

For Boas, the construction of Anthropology as a “science” was crucial to his drive to professionalize the discipline. As such, Anthropologists must needs meet the “highest ethical standards” held for scientists including their expulsion for certain “heretical” acts of which “spying” is amongst the “worst”.³ One point that is crucial to note is that certain key words are

¹ It should be noted that 3 of the 5 members of the executive council that issued the censure had themselves been involved with military intelligence operations in World War I.

² Franz Boas, “Scientists as Spies”, letter to *The Nation*, December 20th, 1919 quoted at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz_Boas#Scientist_as_Activist . See also, “Anthropologists as Spies”, David Price, letter to *The Nation*, November 20th, 2000 available at <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20001120/price>

³ This standard is actually based on a 19th century conception of what a “true” scientist does and how they act. Twentieth century philosophy of science has significantly altered this rather rigid code: see, for example, Karl Popper “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”, Basic Books, New York, 1959 and Thomas Kuhn “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, 2nd Edition, University of Chicago Press, 1970.

used in opposition to “ethics” – “spying”, “deception”, and “falsification” stand out in particular. The reason for this is that the event that prompted this letter had to do with Boas’ indictment of four Anthropologists who had spied for the US government for military intelligence; a “reversion” to the Jeffersonian model of Anthropology that Boas would not countenance.

This obligation or, rather, interpretation of an ethical obligation, has been maintained to this day. It is quite interesting to see that this obligation to the “truth” has, at least for Anthropologists, been modified over time. Let us consider the Statement of Ethics from the American Anthropology Association.¹

1. Relations with those studied

In research, anthropologists’ paramount responsibility is to those they study. When there is a conflict of interest, these individuals must come first. Anthropologists must do everything in their power to protect the physical, social, and psychological welfare and to honor the dignity and privacy of those studied.

a. Where research involves the acquisition of material and information transferred on the assumption of trust between persons, it is axiomatic that the rights, interests, and sensitivities of those studied must be safeguarded.

b. The aims of the investigation should be communicated as well as possible to the informant.

c. Informants have a right to remain anonymous. This right should be respected both where it has been promised explicitly and where no clear understanding to the contrary has been reached. These strictures apply to the collection of data by means of cameras, tape recorders, and other data-gathering devices, as well as to data collected in face-to-face interviews or in participant observation. Those being studied should understand the capacities of such devices; they should be free to reject them if they wish; and if they accept them, the results obtained should be consonant with the informant’s right to welfare, dignity and privacy.

In general, these principles have been used as the basis for using pseudonyms for both individuals and organizations, including purposefully changing some data to make it harder to identify individuals. The basis for this position is twofold: first in Boas’ conceptions of the ethical system which has dominated the discipline for the past 90 years and second for a very pragmatic reason having to do with how Anthropologists gather their data.

ETHICS, FIELDWORK AND KNOWLEDGE

Fieldwork, for a cultural Anthropologist, is a lot more than going to bars and watching people. The North American tradition is to spend a “decent” amount of time, e.g. a minimum of nine months, living with the group you are studying, and time periods, on and off, of twenty to thirty years working with the same group are not that uncommon. Officially, this time is required to gather data and gain a good understanding of the more subtle and hidden aspects of the culture.

¹ Available at <http://aaanet.org/stmts/ethstmnt.htm>

This “understanding” is much more than a surface familiarity, and draws on Dilthey’s distinction between two types of knowledge: *verstehen* or “empathic/intuitive understanding” and *erklären* or “explanatory knowledge”. Today, few use Dilthey’s terms preferring to use the terms “emic” and “etic” respectively. Regardless of which set of terms we use, there is a clear distinction between the method of acquisition, the product, and the effects on the individual of gaining each type of knowledge.

Most people have little difficulty understanding “explanatory knowledge” (aka *erklären* or the etic perspective) and it may be generally interpreted as “scientific knowledge”, “facts”, etc. In its most basic form, it is an “explanation” that “makes sense” of a set of raw sense perceptions; basically a series of rules for selecting sensory data, ordering it in importance and assigning a “meaning” to that ordered data.

This type of knowledge works best in unambiguous situations such as, for example, in manipulating physical reality and is the basis of most of the physical sciences. It also works fairly well in ambiguous situations where the same basic “model of reality” (“culture” in one sense of the word) is shared by all people involved. Thus, by way of example, Soviet and American military personnel shared the same “language” during the Cold War. *Erklären*, however, breaks down completely when there is little shared basis of interpretations of reality. For example, the Coalition forces in Iraq do not speak the same “language” as the insurgents or the general populace.

Unlike *erklären*, *verstehen* is somewhat more difficult for many people to grasp. Translating it as “empathic or intuitive knowledge” doesn’t really help to explain what it is or how it is used by cultural Anthropologists in conducting fieldwork. To understand what it is and how it is used, we have to draw on some different material.

The methodology used by most cultural Anthropologists conducting fieldwork is called “Participant Observation”. While the specifics of how to conduct this type of fieldwork vary, most agree that it requires a fairly long time (9+ months) “living” with the group you are studying. The ideal established by Malinowski was to drop your tent in the middle of the village and stay for a year. While you are there, you talk with people, conduct formal and informal interviews, “hang around”, record social interactions, watch people at work and play, take lots of pictures and video, make maps, etc. Obviously, in order to conduct good fieldwork, there has to be a high degree of mutual trust.

In some cases, notably when it is impossible to physically go to a field site, other versions of the same “immersion” type of research may be conducted. For example, most active “fieldwork” conducted by American Anthropologists involved in World War II military operations was of a form known as The Study of Culture at a Distance¹. It involved immersing oneself in the artifacts of the culture: food, language, movies, media, books, clothing, etc., at least as much as was possible. The actual methodology, at least as it is described by Mead and Métraux

¹ Margaret Mead and Rhoda Métraux (editors), “The Study of Culture at a Distance”, University of Chicago Press, 1953.

and, also, by Ruth Benedict in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*¹, is very similar to that described by Stanislavski as *The System* or by Lee Strasberg as *The Method*.

In an essay entitled *Resonance in Imagery* from 1953, Rhoda Metraux, discusses how we build an "image" in our minds of a "typical" member of the groups we study. If you read the essay closely, you will notice that what she is really talking about is creating a "persona" or a "character" (in the sense of method acting) in our minds.² Or, to put it another way, we create a personality that is different from our "self" that we can access at will and "switch" into.

All of these methods involve a total immersion into either the culture or the role and the described results are similar – there is an "intuitive understanding" (*verstehen*). Achieving this intuitive understanding is crucial, since the end goal of most ethnographic research is to reformulate the explanatory models (*erklaren*) used in communicating findings. In many cases, the explanatory models of the "natives" have a higher predictive validity than do the explanatory models used by "us". This is most obvious in any model designed to predict what a given group of people will do, but there have also been examples in the natural sciences (ecological resource management and indigenous medical knowledge systems are two examples).

The "problem" is that the form of *verstehen* developed by these methodologies relies on the creation of a persona of the "other" within "our" own psyches. So what does this mean in terms of the debate over Anthropology being involved with the military, and why are Anthropologists so hung up on the idea of "spying"? Put simply, the very act of applying these methodologies to the study of an "enemy" creates a persona of that "enemy" in our own minds. In effect, "we" would be "spying" on ourselves if we were to conduct fieldwork on a group with the specific purpose of "pacification".

WHEN IS "SPYING" NOT "SPYING"?

Anthropology actually evolved as an intellectual tool to consolidate imperial power at the margins of empire.³

The decisions and actions of anthropologists during World War II and other times must be viewed in the historical context of their times.... While past wartime anthropological decisions may be seen as appropriate for their times, the context of contemporary war raises many more complex and problematic issues.⁴

While ethnography for the purpose of pacification and/or direct attack has been done in the past, most notably during the inter-war period by British Social Anthropologists and in World War II, it requires an ideological framework that can justify that work as for the greater good for both the group studied and the group doing the studying. We have two, major,

¹ Ruth Benedict, "The Chrysanthemum and the Sword", Houghton Mifflin, 1946

² Rhoda Metraux, *Resonance in Imagery* in "The Study of Culture at a Distance", Mead and Metraux (eds), pages 343-362

³ McFate, *op. cit.* page 28

⁴ David Price, *Lessons from Second World War anthropology*, *Anthropology Today*, Vol 18(3), June 2002

historical examples of successful ideological frameworks that allow for this type of ethnography.

This first ideological framework, often couched in terms of the direct vs. indirect rule debate, allowed many British Social Anthropologist to believe that their work would lead to a “greater good” for the groups being studied. This was expressed very nicely by Malinowski:¹

The real difference between ‘direct rule’ and ‘indirect or dependant rule’ consists in the fact that direct rule assumes you can create at one go an entirely new order, that you can transform Africans into semi-civilized pseudo-European citizens within a few years. Indirect rule, on the other hand, recognizes that no such magical rapid transformation can take place, that in reality all social development is very slow, and that it is infinitely preferable to achieve it by a slow and gradual change coming from within.

While the situation today is obviously different in that the debate is not centered on the most effective means of “civilizing” the peoples of colonial possessions, there are obvious analogs in both the current political and military debates. However, unlike the inter-war colonial period, the social justifications for current operations in Iraq are both constrained as military operations (i.e. the “pre-emptive strike” rhetoric) and have been dismissed by many as unjustified (e.g. accusations of slanting intelligence reports to meet policy requirements). The final telling point concerning the social justification for OIF is that, unlike operations in Afghanistan, the United States did not receive a final imprimatur from the United Nations.²

The second ideological framework that has successfully mobilized Anthropologists to conduct military work came out of World War II and the general belief that this was a “just war”. It was also a war in which the primary opponent, Nazi Germany, held an ideological position that was directly opposed to that of American Anthropology. As David Price notes:³

Because American Anthropology's most significant scientific and political contribution during the first half of the 20th century was the development of the Boasian critique of the concept of race, many American anthropologists found the Nazis to be an enemy of the core principles of anthropology.

The situation in World War II presented a unique combination of factors – a “just war” and an opponent who also opposed some of the core tenets of American Anthropology. While this is not the place to detail the contributions of Anthropologists in World War II, suffice it to say that by 1943, over 60% of Anthropology Ph.D.s in the United States were employed in positions directly relating to the war effort including DoD and the OSS.⁴

¹ Bronislaw Malinowski, Practical Anthropology, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January, 1929) pp. 22-38

² While there are many different views on the efficacy of the United Nations, few would deny that, if nothing else, it is the primary venue for achieving an international moral justification for inter-state actions.

³ David Price, 2002, *op. cit.*, page 15

⁴ For detailed discussions of the role of Anthropologists in World War II, see George W. Stocking, ‘Ideas and Institutions in American Anthropology: Toward a History of the Interwar Period’, in G.W. Stocking (ed.) Selected Papers from the American Anthropologist, pp. 1–54. Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association, 1976; Robert F. Murphy, ‘Introduction: A Quarter Century of American Anthropology’, in R. Murphy (ed.) Selected

While there certainly has been an attempt to make a symbolic equation¹ between OIF and World War II by many members of the US Administration, notably by ex-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and both President Bush and Vice-President Cheney, this has not been generally accepted.² Indeed, the use of this rhetoric may well have backfired causing an increasing discontent with the Coalition presence in Iraq and shifting the public debate from the effects of a pull-out on the Global War on Terror, to one of “we should / shouldn’t have started it” which is more reminiscent of Vietnam than World War II.

The symbolic equation between OIF and Vietnam is especially important for many Anthropologists. In the post-World War II era, a significant proportion of Anthropological research was subtly guided by government agencies, primarily by the selective use of funding, a situation that led to increasing concern within the discipline.³ This concern spilled out into the open as a result of two Vietnam era scandals: Project Camelot and the Thai Scandal, both of which implicated Anthropologists as being complicit in ethically questionable activities.⁴ These two scandals, combined with a growing unease over sources of funding and a growing anti-war protest movement led the American Anthropological Association (AAA) to a position of banning “secret research” in 1971.

While the specific restrictions, as listed in the AAA Code of Ethics, have loosened somewhat since the 1971 ban⁵ the disciplinary cultural reactions have, if anything, increased. Price⁶ notes an interesting example of this from 1996:

The sensitivity of even discussing past links between anthropologists and the intelligence community can be seen in the brouhaha that erupted after archaeologist Anna Roosevelt noted in passing that the American archaeologists and cultural anthropologists working in South America in the post-war era 'first fanned out in Latin America, often with close ties to the US government and its foreign policies, through the OSS (later to become the CIA) and the State Department... For this simple observation, Roosevelt became the target of a vitriolic protest letter denouncing her statements as 'not only highly irresponsible, but also dangerous', published in the official organ of the Society for American Archaeology (SAA), and bearing the signatures of 188 prominent archaeologists.

The important point from this is that the culture of Anthropology has, at least in the recent past, conflated all relationships with the military into the singular relationship of "spying". Even before McFate published her article in 2005, the issue of spying had entered the public discourse. The event that brought the issue to a head was the creation of the Pat

Papers from the American Anthropologist, pp. 1–22. Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association, 1976; and David Price, 2002 *op. cit.*

¹ The term “symbolic equation” refers to the creation of a perceptual analogy between one symbol and another symbol such that the second symbol takes on the emotional connotations of the first symbol.

² See, for example, Ricks *Fiasco*.

³ See David Price, Subtle Means and Enticing Carrots, *Critique of Anthropology*, 23(4): 373-401, 2003

⁴ See McFate, 2005 *op. cit.* pp 35-37.

⁵ See David Price, Anthropologists as Spies, *The Nation*, November 20th, 2000 available at <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20001120/price>

⁶ David Price, Interloperas and Invited Guests, *Anthropology Today*, 18(6) December, 2002 page 17

Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP)¹ and the Intelligence Community Scholars Program (ICSP) in December, 2003. While an original version of PRISP had been supported by University of Kansas Anthropologist Felix Moos, a quick, and highly negative reaction, was soon posted on the American Anthropological Association's web site entitled "Spies in our Midst" authored by Hugh Gusterson and David Price.² The crux of their objections to these programs is quite obviously spying.

PRISP and ICSP use current fears to turn back the clock on these developments, reestablishing a beachhead of government secrecy in the academy. Such conditions of secrecy stand to undermine the quality of academic knowledge and intelligence produced because they preclude honest debate. We are particularly concerned that while universities seek to inculcate honesty among students, many PRISP and ICSP students will be expected to concoct fraudulent narratives about themselves, systematically deceiving faculty and fellow students about commitments their sponsors want kept secret. While we have little control over the secretive actions of others, as anthropologists we need to be open and clear about who we are, who we work for, and what is to be done with our research. Any involvement or passive support of PRISP undermines the reputation of anthropology in the US and abroad, for if anthropology becomes indirectly tied, no matter how involuntarily, to US foreign policy decisions through the training of intelligence agents, it could put some anthropologists and those with whom we work in danger.

There are two points I want to highlight. First, consider the following sentence "While we have little control over the secretive actions of others, as anthropologists we need to be open and clear about who we are, who we work for, and what is to be done with our research." This clearly harkens back to Boas' 1919 differentiation of "Scientist" ("pure") vs. "non-Scientist" ("impure") an "us-them" dichotomy. McFate (2005:36-37), in discussing the status of the "secret", notes that

As a result of Project Camelot and the Thai scandal, government funding and use of social science research became suspect. Anthropologists feared that, were such research to continue, the indigenous people they studied would assume they were all spies, closing off future field opportunities abroad. Many anthropologists also believed the information would be used to control, enslave, and even annihilate many of the communities studied. The result of these debates is the determination that for anthropologists to give secret briefings is ethically unacceptable. The AAA's current "Statement of Professional Responsibility" says: "Anthropologists should undertake no secret research or any research whose results cannot be freely derived and publicly reported. . . . No secret research, no secret reports or debriefings of any kind should be agreed to or given." These guidelines reflect a widespread view among anthropologists that any research undertaken for the military is de facto evil and ethically unacceptable.

Where the dichotomy constructed by Gusterson and Price becomes operational is in the next sentence – "Any involvement or passive support of PRISP undermines the reputation of anthropology", therefore anyone who does not speak out against PRISP is committing the

¹ For information on PRISP, see <http://www.intelligence.gov/0-prisp.shtml> , <http://www.aaanet.org/press/an/infocus/prisp/nuti-faqs.htm> ,

² Available at <http://www.aaanet.org/press/an/infocus/prisp/gusterson.htm>

professional “crime” of “undermining the reputation of Anthropology”. Obviously, anyone who does this cannot be one of “us” by their own choice and actions, since these actions “...could put some anthropologists and those with whom we work in danger.”

While the Gustafson and Price article is clearly a “civilized” warning to the community of Anthropologists it draws a not too subtle line in the sand. By using a rhetoric of “you are with us or against us”, they are clearly attempting to establish the parameters of any debate in the discipline where the “discussion” takes place only in questions of how extreme the penalty for supporting “them” should be.

This is beautifully exemplified in the reactions by the general community of Anthropologists in North America to McFates (2005) article taking place on the *Savage Minds* blog.¹ For example, posting on *Savage Minds*, Jack McBride² says

In response to McFate’s article I must preface that I am quite familiar with her work and her own personal former ethical delimitations in their presentation. She for instance refused to publish her doctoral thesis from Yale on Military Insurgency in Northern Ireland for fear that it would be used to destroy the IRA, having been allowed into their covert world, as an observer and a supposed sympathizer. She was torn as to what end the information she had gathered would be used. I am disheartened to see that for her the cost is simply that, how much she is willing to be paid to “spy” for the military. Something that she does and has done often in her personal life, having been previously employed as a corporate spy. Curious times indeed. Sad to see when your friends turn into neo cons over night for a pay check. [spelling errors in original]

Continuing the rhetorical vector of exclusion, Boas’ comments about prostituting science have increasingly come to be applied to any research that does not support the “rights” of the “politically oppressed”. The degree to which the moral value of Anthropology as a search for “truth” has shifted into Anthropology as the “defender of the oppressed” is evident in some of the other reaction to McFate’s (2005) article. One clear illustration of this is a comment made by Paul McDowell in the *Savage Minds* comments section³:

As damnable as McFate’s compromise with the military is, it seems to me that there is an even more insidious ethics compromise among practicing anthropologists: working for multinational corporations. Like the government and its military, corporations don’t care a rat’s posterior about the so-called target population studied by anthropologists on the behalf of their corporate patron.

Outside of the personal slanders, one of the things I find most interesting about this comment is that it actually doesn’t address any issues raised in the McFate article. Since McFate’s work was with the IRA and her article talks about dealing with Iraq, I fail to see how the issue of “spying” comes up unless the term “spying” has been warped to include having

¹ Available at <http://savageminds.org/2005/05/19/anthropologists-as-counter-insurgents>

² <http://savageminds.org/2005/05/19/anthropologists-as-counter-insurgents/#comment-318> Posted June 16th, 2005.

³ <http://savageminds.org/2005/05/19/anthropologists-as-counter-insurgents/#comment-1063> Posted August 4th, 2005.

anything to do with the military or intelligence communities. Indeed, McFate (2005:37) states that:

Successful counterinsurgency depends on attaining a holistic, total understanding of local culture. This cultural understanding must be thorough and deep if it is to have any practical benefit at all. This fact is not lost on the Army. In the language of interim FM 3–07.22: "The center of gravity in counterinsurgency operations is the population. Therefore, understanding the local society and gaining its support is critical to success. For U.S. forces to operate effectively among a local population and gain and maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, including its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and needs."

Nowhere do I see her advocating using Anthropologists or Archaeologists as spies in the sense used by Boas. Rather, it appears to me that her desire is to see Anthropological *analytic* techniques and understandings applied to the counter-insurgency operations. Despite this, the debate, at least in the public forums, seems to have been clearly established as dealing with how far to go in cutting off a "heretic" and open, above board, examinations of the merits, and dangers, of Anthropologists operating with the Military and Intelligence communities languishes covered in a shroud of moral rectitude.

AAA RESOLUTIONS AGAINST THE WAR IN IRAQ

On November 18th, 2006 two resolutions were passed at the business meeting of the AAA. As Price notes:

The first resolution condemns the American occupation of Iraq; calls for an immediate withdrawal of troops, the payment of reparations, and it asks that all individuals committing war crimes against Iraqis be prosecuted. This statement passed with little debate or dissent.

The second resolution condemns not only the use of torture by the Bush administration, but it denounces the use of anthropological knowledge in torture and extreme interrogations.... One of the concerns underlying this resolution comes from reports by Seymour Hersh that CIA interrogators consulted anthropological works such as Raphael Patai's book, *The Arab Mind*, to better design culture-specific means of torture and interrogation. This resolution passed unanimously with little debate.¹

The first resolution appears to have generated little debate either at the business meeting or online <http://jimcassidy.ca/moodle/mod/forum/post.php?delete=269>. The second, however, has generated quite a storm online and has brought out the equation between the military, spying and, now, "torture" to a head over the question of the "misuse" of Anthropological knowledge. Gerald Sider, a professor emeritus at CUNY, described the intent of the second motion as

¹ David H. Price *American Anthropologists Stand Up against Torture and the Occupation of Iraq*. Counterpunch, November 20th, 2006 available at <http://www.counterpunch.com/price11202006.html>

We're trying to do something against mealy-mouthed policies that don't hold responsible those scum with Ph.D.'s who stand beside torturers¹

The addition of "torture" to the symbolic equation was also mentioned by Price when he noted that

Obviously each of these motions will likely have no direct impact on the Bush Administration, Congress, rogue anthropologists, or CIA contract torturers, but the events of Saturday's meeting do represent a noteworthy democratic moment in the history of American anthropology and in higher academia's struggle to retain some control over the knowledge it produces.²

Of equal, albeit less acrimonious, interest is what may be the start of a backlash against this rhetoric. In some of the debate on *Savage Minds* following the resolutions, Ed Liebow made some interesting observations. First, in speaking of the general "feel" of the business meeting, Liebow notes that

My own sense, however, is that had anyone had the temerity to point out that the sweeping generalizations in the language of the two resolutions actually serves to undermine the Association's credibility, they would have been shouted down by the "coercive harmony" (to use the phrase David Price borrows from Laura Nader) of angry activists wanting to turn back the clock to the glory days of campus protests.³

Liebow also notes several substantive issues with the resolutions.

We also simultaneously called for the withdrawal of all US troops and the establishment of a UN peace-keeping force – that I guess would have to limp along without the US since its troops are to be withdrawn.

I find such high-temperature rhetoric to be self-defeating, as it undermines the Association's credibility and allows its intended audience to discount a deeply felt and widely held sense of the Association.⁴

Similar concerns, although of a broader scope, were expressed by Riall W. Nolan, Dean of International Programs at Purdue in response to *Torture and Social Science* posted on *Inside HigherEd.com*

I'm wholeheartedly against the notion of anthropologists getting involved with torture, and I'm glad folks in the AAA finally spoke up. But the wider question, not yet addressed, is what role anthropology should or could play in matters of national security....

My worry is that anthropology may have become too self-marginalized as a discipline, increasingly irrelevant to the big questions of the day in our world, content to snipe from the sidelines as soon as it seems safe.

¹ *Torture and Social Scientists*, Inside Higher Ed, November 22nd, 2006 available at <http://insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/22/anthro>

² David H. Price *American Anthropologists Stand Up against Torture and the Occupation of Iraq*. Counterpunch, November 20th, 2006 available at <http://www.counterpunch.com/price11202006.html>

³ Ed Liebow, comment on *AAA Democracy*, available at <http://savageminds.org/2006/11/20/aaa-democracy/#comment-40686>

⁴ *ibid*

But we actually have a great deal to contribute to a national debate on the morality of our current conduct around the world, and on the question of how to use our disciplinary insights to move us beyond the “us and them” paradigm that’s currently fashionable in Washington.

It would be nice if anthropologists could be among those leading this discussion, rather than merely following it at a safe distance.¹

The reverberations within American Anthropology of these two motions will continue for, at a minimum, the next six months as the AAA must now send out paper ballots to all members for ratification. Nor is it likely to end there, as both the national debate over the Coalition presence in Iraq and the disciplinary debate over any association with the military will, in all probability, intensify.

CONCLUSIONS

... unfortunately, anthropologists, whose assistance is urgently needed in time of war, entirely neglect U.S. forces. Despite the fact that military applications of cultural knowledge might be distasteful to ethically inclined anthropologists, their assistance is necessary.²

McFate’s conclusion, quoted above, is in many ways incorrect: American Anthropology has not neglected the US military, it has condemned it. This condemnation does not arise out of a reasoned analysis of the issues surrounding any individual conflict but, rather, out of an extreme distaste for the military and the lack of a clear ideological justification for Operation Iraqi Freedom that has spilled over into any operation in the Global War on Terror. It is interesting to note that all of the condemnation centers on operations in Iraq rather than operations in Afghanistan where there was some semblance of an ideological justification via the UN.

The roots of this “extreme distaste for the military” are quite deep in the modern discipline, going back to the end of World War I, and reinforced during both the Cold War and Vietnam. American Anthropology, as a discipline, does not trust either the military or the intelligence community. Certainly for the present and immediate future, it appears that the more vocal members of the discipline prefer the use of highly polarized rhetoric to a reasoned analysis and debate. As Nolan commented,

It would be nice if anthropologists could be among those leading this discussion, rather than merely following it at a safe distance.³

Marc Tyrrell currently teaches Anthropology and Interdisciplinary Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. His primary research interest is in how people construct “meaning”, broadly construed, and he has researched such diverse areas as modern Neo-Pagan Witchcraft, Career Counseling and Organizational Culture. He holds a Ph.D. in Sociology (Social Anthropology), has

¹ *Op. cit.*

² *McFate, 2005 op. cit.*

³ *Op. cit.*

presented papers at the Canadian Anthropology Society, the American Sociological Association and Microsoft Research, and has published in numerous venues including M@n@gement and the Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate (Sage, 2000).

NAVAL UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE:

SUPPORTING GWOT ON THE CHEAP

Chris Rawley

After half a decade, the U.S. Navy continues the struggle for relevancy in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Several positive programs and a few knee jerk policies have been implemented, such as the stand up of the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command and short notice individual augmentation deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. But an overall operational maritime concept designed to directly support the war remains illusive.

The United States military's ground forces have employed counter-terrorism operations emphasizing unconventional warfare (UW) to counter the fourth generation tactics of a dynamic enemy. By adapting UW doctrine to the maritime environment, the U.S. Navy has an opportunity to secure its role in the GWOT. The Department of Defense defines Unconventional Warfare to include a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations predominately utilizing indigenous or surrogate forces. UW is normally conducted in a low visibility or clandestine manner. Although UW is often seen in the context of supporting a guerilla force trying to overthrow an established government, it also has applicability supporting indigenous or proxy forces working to regain control of terrain from terrorist. A large amount of this terrain is found in the thousands of miles of ungoverned coastlines, rivers, and other littoral waterways around the world. These areas can become a refuge to terrorists because many nations are either unable or unwilling to fully control their own sovereign territory. Specific examples include the expansive riparian networks in South America and Central Asia, archipelagic waters throughout Southeast Asia, and much of coastal Africa.

Naval unconventional warfare (NUW) is the employment of maritime forces in non-traditional ways to accomplish operational goals related to counter-terrorism. NUW operations include some common aspects designed to influence the maritime environment in a way that facilitates U.S. freedom of action and makes an area inhospitable to terrorist elements. The operational foundations for NUW are partner capacity building, intelligence collection, and low profile operations.

CREATING MARITIME PARTNERS

America recognizes that the GWOT cannot be won by unilateral military action. In addition to creating new counter-terrorism capability, utilizing partners in NUW provides a number of advantages over conventional U.S. maritime operations. A properly executed NUW campaign can provide U.S. forces access to other nations' sovereign territorial waters and littoral areas that might otherwise provide safe havens for enemy operations. Building capacity also gives legitimacy to the government or partners that we are trying to assist.

Only relationships built through long-term engagement at the lowest level will provide the access and intelligence required for counter-terrorism operations. Traditional short term engagement activities such as bilateral naval exercises and community relations projects during port visits will not be sufficient to build the level of trust required for NUW. Instead, whenever possible, we must embed U.S. Sailors with partners for the long term.

Larger near-peer navies who have been reliable U.S. allies in the past should not be the focus of UW. Countries that are wealthy enough to afford high-end naval platforms generally also maintain good control over their sovereign waterways. NUW partner building efforts should be oriented towards less traditional allies in undeveloped countries such as coast guards, maritime police units, and even indigenous mariners, such as those in merchant and fishing fleets.

NUW should avoid the trap of buying new capabilities for a partner maritime force that are unsustainable without ongoing U.S. financial and logistics support. Too often, investments in high end command and control systems such as CENTRIX systems end up becoming expensive paperweights in the “command centers” of our poorer maritime partners. High speed patrol boats end up on cinderblocks, because they can’t be maintained over the long term. Much more value and trust can be gained by having full time U.S. Navy advisors embedded with our partners, no matter the size or resources of their naval forces. NUW advisory teams should strive to transform and improve the maritime capabilities of partners with whatever equipment they can afford to maintain, even if the U.S. considers those platforms to be substandard or incompatible with coalition operations. Ideally, successful long term NUW missions will evolve from just building partner capacity into increasing partner willingness to share intelligence and participate in operations which support U.S. GWOT goals.

BUILDING INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS

Intelligence collection should be integral to all NUW activities. In addition to finding safe harbor in ungoverned regions, terrorists often exploit transnational illicit maritime activities such as drug trafficking, smuggling, and piracy. Human intelligence is critical to countering these types of support to terrorist networks. NUW intelligence efforts should be designed to increase understanding of tribal and familial affiliations, local maritime commerce patterns, and terrorist interaction with commercial and non-governmental organizations. Analyzing these illicit support network nodes will facilitate target development for surrogate or unilateral actions against them. NUW will enable U.S. forces to link into a partner’s informal or formal intelligence networks to gain local knowledge that would be otherwise unobtainable. Furthermore, NUW can afford opportunities for assessing the effects of U.S. information operations and strategic communications efforts through direct feedback from partner forces.

NUW IN ACTION

The 2006 deployment of the hospital ship *USNS Mercy* to Southeast Asia is a good example of how existing forces can undertake an NUW-like mission. Her crew of U.S. and

Military Sealift Command sailors, medical corps, foreign military, and non-governmental organizations deployed in a task unit that delivered care to over 60,000 individuals. While this deployment was received with a significant positive response from the people served and had an obvious information operations value for the United States in several Islamic countries, it could also be seen in the context of an NUW partnership operation. While it would be a public relations coup for the U.S. to take full credit for these types of operations, it is important that these missions are conducted in a way that creates the illusion to the affected population that the partner nation or indigenous partner conducted the operation unilaterally, or at least served a lead role in the operation. Although intelligence collection wasn't an objective of this humanitarian deployment, certainly operating in these types of environment and interacting so closely with the people on the ground played an important role in prepping the environment for future intelligence operations. In another positive step for NUW, similar operations have taken place with a U.S. Navy tender involving several West African partner militaries.

Mercy's deployment also illustrates NUW's capacity as a force multiplier. Traditional naval engagement activities are done with large surface combatants or amphibious ships. With only about 30% of the 278 ships in the U.S. Navy's inventory deployed at any given time, the opportunities for shaping the maritime environment will be limited unless we expand the platforms available to conduct NUW. For example, a civilian crewed Maritime Prepositioning Force ship loaded with humanitarian supplies and an embarked civil affairs teams might perform infrastructure projects throughout Southeast Asia while also gaining intelligence on terrorist supporting piracy activities in the Straits of Malacca. A chartered offshore oil service vessel and embarked helicopter could provide mobility for a combined U.S. and foreign special forces team partnering to conduct counter-terrorism missions in West Africa. These are just a few examples of how NUW could expand the reach and impact of today's navy to shaping the maritime environment more favorably for the GWOT.

NUW could also play a role in naval warfare against a more conventional maritime threat. Naval doctrine seeks to overwhelm the enemy with quantitatively and qualitatively more powerful platforms. NUW can evolve this paradigm into a high leverage form of naval warfighting. Using UW principles, a small number of coalition special operations teams with advanced communications and airpower killed thousands of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan. A few U.S. Sailors and their supporting maritime partners on an innocuous looking indigenous vessel would be equally capable of decimating a large waterborne terrorist fast attack craft force using terminally guided smart munitions and direct fire weapons.

DON'T FORGET THE HUMAN FACTOR

Employment of lessons learned and cooperation with joint special operations and other ground component forces experienced in irregular warfare is a good start to implementing NUW. Additional innovative deployments such as Mercy's are important too. An even more critical task though, is to develop the human capital necessary to defeat the Islamic extremists-driven global insurgency. One might assume that the only way to achieve that goal is to

expand the numbers of naval Foreign Area Officers. Clearly, this program is an important source of regional experts, but our irregular warfare should be drawn from rank and file line and staff officers and enlisted leaders. These Sailors should maintain their warfare qualifications and career path, but bring their unique perspectives gained in NUW operations back into their traditional billets.

The emphasis on naval officer accessions with engineering majors should be reduced and instead, more focus placed on those who have studied outcast subjects such as sociology, history, psychology, and anthropology. Humans, not hardware, are the center of gravity in the GWOT, and we need naval officers who understand the motivations, inclinations, and fears of people on all levels. We should reduce recruiting targets for “traditional” diversity categories and instead focus on finding and vetting foreign born mariners who can operate culturally in the areas of concern for the GWOT. Of course, these Sailors will need to be put through additional levels of background and security clearance screening, but their innate cultural expertise and utility in NUW intelligence collection cannot be found or developed in American-born recruits.

This war is going to be a long one and parallels to the Cold War are appropriate. During that conflict, the Navy embraced line officers who became Soviet naval experts. Rather than perceiving NUW experts as second class citizens of the officer and enlisted corps, they should be cultivated as a critical link to winning the War on Terror. As many of today’s admirals grew up chasing Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic, tomorrow’s flag officers should be chosen from those with direct experience supporting the GWOT through NUW operations on the littorals and ground.

Many may argue that NUW will reduce the Navy’s readiness for longer range conventional maritime threats. Embracing NUW does not any way mean the U.S. Navy will have to abdicate its blue water missions and dominance of the high seas. On the contrary, because NUW is focused more on people than expensive platforms and technologies, traditional naval operations will not be negatively impacted. The Navy is being dragged kicking and screaming into fighting the messy, human-focused war we must win now rather than the hardware-centric blue water battles most naval officers want. With a little creativity and a small investment in people, Naval Unconventional Warfare will bring a significant pay off in shaping an environment favorable for the GWOT.

Chris Rawley has served in a variety of military and civilian positions supporting the Global War on Terrorism. As a Lieutenant Commander, in the Navy Reserve, he has deployed around the world, including to Iraq. He was responsible for developing counter-terrorism strategy while serving at Special Operations Command South. He is currently the Deputy Program Manager for the United States Private-Public Partnership, a homeland security information sharing program. He earned a BS in Political Science at Texas A&M University, an MBA at George Washington University, and is a graduate of the United States Naval War College

HEAVY ARMOUR IN SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES

G. Gabriel Serbu

“Before considering the question that is seemingly always the most immediate one and the only urgent one, ‘What shall we do?’, we ponder this: ‘How must we think?’”

– Martin Heidegger

INTRODUCTION¹

The skilful conduct of warfare is an intellectual exercise that requires of an officer not only an overall knowledge of the enemy, but also a comprehension of all resources open at his disposal. The use of force has different results according to the means that he employs. Moreover, the order in which these assets are used is of vital importance.

Today, it is accepted practice that an enemy position should not be attacked by infantry without preparatory artillery or aerial strikes. “Softening” the defender greatly facilitates the task of the attacker. In the above-mentioned scenario, the decision-maker (officer, senior NCO, etc.) has two channels through which he can dispense force: infantry and artillery. The preferred order is: first the use of artillery (or air) strikes and then that of the infantry assault. The infantry assault itself is subject to strict regulations. Commonly, a part of the unit provides a “base of fire” which compels the enemy to keep his head down, while a separate fraction manoeuvres to take advantage of a guarded line of approach. In the absence of a “base of fire”, it is not unusual for the assaulting infantrymen to provide their own massed covering fire as they advance². The sequence in which military power is delivered is shaped by doctrine, which is, in its turn, the creation of past experience tempered by common sense.

Military doctrine gives meaning and defines the purpose of all assets available to combatants (regardless of rank). Without it any army organized along Western principles would break down. But doctrines have drawbacks. They are inflexible. Their application can be often predictable, giving the advantage to any ingenious and determined enemy. For practical reasons, they also simplify the definitions of “all means accessible” to military personnel. The result is that decision-makers within the armed forces have an incomplete grasp of all resources they can use; and they are unaware that assets have to be defined in the specific context they are used. But, before approaching the question of heavy armour in small wars and insurgencies, one has to first individually define the asset (heavy armour) and the context (guerrilla warfare).

¹ Martin Heidegger, “The Turning” in *The Question of Technology and Other Essays* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 40

² This particular approach is called “prophylactic firepower”; see Paddy Griffith, *The Ultimate Weaponry* (Leicester: Blitz Editions, 1995), p.18.

This paper will assess the success or failure that the vigorous use of heavy armour has during operations conducted in the specific context of small wars and insurgencies. The essay is a purely theoretical expose, and its conclusions should not be interpreted as a forthright criticism directed against American and NATO counter insurgency approaches in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

THE CHALLENGE OF DEFINING SMALL WARS – THE CONTEXT.

Definitions of small wars and insurgencies abound. Almost all of them are **descriptive**, in other words they focus on recounting the main characteristics of insurgents and of the ways they operate in. The Oxford English Dictionary defines guerrilla warfare as: “an irregular war carried on by small bodies of men acting independently.”³ The main limitation of descriptive definitions is that they fall short of creating an intellectual framework that could facilitate the conceptualization of any feasible counter insurgency methods. This failing is due to the fact that descriptive “small wars” definitions isolate insurgents from definitions of their opponents in a theoretical vacuum.

There are very few **analytical** definitions, which describe insurgents in context with conventional armies. One of them belongs to T.E. Lawrence. He described guerrilla warfare by using six fundamental principles of insurgency:

- First, a successful guerrilla movement must have an unassailable base.
- Second, the guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated enemy.
- Third, the enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy the disputed territory in depth with a system of interlocking fortified posts.
- Fourth, the guerrilla must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not its full involvement.
- Fifth, the irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance, presence and logistical independence.
- Sixth, the irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike the enemy’s logistics and signals vulnerabilities.”⁴

Analytical definitions – such as Lawrence’s – are thorough. Instead of focusing exclusively on the subject being considered, they examine it not only in the specific environment in which it operates, but also in relation with other subjects.

Aside from being unproductive, descriptive definitions can be actually misleading. For example, small wars and insurgencies are often referred to as “asymmetric warfare”. This means that guerrilla war is described strictly as a non-conventional approach to armed conflict. The definition does not say what guerrilla war is, it describes what it is not; that is, it is not the natural response a conventional force should expect from its enemy. This is simply inaccurate.

³ Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 900.

⁴ James J. Schneider, “T.E. Lawrence and the Mind of an Insurgent”, *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Spring 2006, p. 14.

During the Second Punic War, instead of directly confronting a superior army under Hannibal's command, Fabius adopted a strategy of evasion. Through repeated and calculated pin-pricks, the Roman consul managed to successfully harass and demoralize the Carthaginians:

“Hovering in the enemy's neighbourhood, cutting off stragglers and foraging parties, preventing them from gaining any permanent base, Fabius remained an elusive shadow on the horizon, dimming the glamour of Hannibal's triumphal progress. Thus, Fabius, by his immunity from defeat, thwarted the effect of Hannibal's previous victories upon the minds of Rome's Italian allies and checked them from changing sides. This guerilla type of campaign also revived the spirit of Roman troops while depressing the Carthaginians who, having ventured so far from home, were the more conscious of the necessity of gaining an early decision.”⁵

Vercingetorix, the legendary king of Gaul, used guerrilla warfare along with a scorched earth strategy against the armies of Julius Caesar⁶. The Gauls' successful ambushes wrecked havoc among Roman foraging parties that ventured too far from their camps. One of the reasons why Fabius succeeded and Vercingetorix failed revolves around T. E. Lawrence's first fundamental principle of insurgency: Caesar won the Battle of Alesia, while, for unknown reasons, Hannibal fell short of besieging and sacking Rome. Guerrilla movements cannot be defeated as long as their base of operations remains intact.

Throughout the Seven Years' War, the Prussians were quantitatively inferior since they were fighting an entire coalition of enemies. As a reaction to this weakness, Frederick the Great adopted the Fabian strategy: he tried, and succeeded, to minimize any direct contact with the opponent. Instead, he focused on harassing the enemy by cutting his lines of communication⁷, while at the same time attempting to transform minor military successes into major diplomatic victories.

Did Fabius, Vercingetorix and Frederick the Great engaged their foes in “asymmetric warfare”? Asymmetry requires infrequency, while history is full of examples such as the three mentioned above. However, it should be pointed out that the guerrilla techniques used in the three cases were applied against the background of high-intensity conflict (HIC). Small wars are more often than not associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC). “Societies fight the way they are organized”⁸, the intensity level of a conflict is not always a matter of rational choice, but the by-product of a particular social paradigm. Furthermore, countries with comparable standards of civilization are more likely to engage in HIC when at war. Military analysts should focus less on the intensity level of a conflict and more on the means used by combatants to achieve their strategic aims.

⁵ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Meridian, 1991), p. 27.

⁶ John Peddle, *The Roman War Machine* (Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1994), p. 43.

⁷ Avi Kober, “Attrition in Modern and Post-Modern War” in *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality*, edited by Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 77.

⁸ Captain (N) Chris Henderson, “Reporting Live from Kandahar”, *Canadian Military Journal*, Summer 2006, p.85. Also, “...the military body is the most complete expression of the spirit of a social system.” Charles de Gaulle, *The Army of the Future* (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1941), p. 179.

As Peter H. Denton pointed out in “The End of Asymmetry: Force Disparity and the Aims of War”,

“Symmetry’ and ‘asymmetry’ are the ends of a continuous spectrum that assumes a common measure between comparable things. Whatever the measure used, something is more or less symmetrical or asymmetrical when it is compared to something else. When the comparison is between apples and screwdrivers, or between oranges and circuit boards, however, there is little value in using asymmetry to describe their relations.”⁹

In other words, the dichotomy asymmetry/symmetry loses all relevance when in combat one side is wielding spears, while the other launches Tomahawk cruise missiles (to use a somehow extreme example).

Historians and military analysts should avoid artificial, intellectually barren and rigid notions such as “asymmetry” in describing contemporary conflicts¹⁰. Their focus should be on the approach a military commander uses to free himself from the constraints under which warfare operates. Under unfavourable circumstances any intelligent and responsible senior officer is expected to use his initiative and to employ the best strategy available to him, not the one dictated by tradition, habit or doctrine.

In war (particularly in guerrilla warfare), the weaker side (in terms of numbers, training, equipment or leadership) can only prevail if it emphasizes manoeuvre over direct contact. Such an approach has nothing “asymmetric” about it. It is merely the result of imagination, audacity and talent, qualities that should be also prerequisites for all officers and senior NCOs.

At no time should we accept as true the assertion according to which there are many types of war. As Carl von Clausewitz, the most quoted and least read military theorist, once wrote, war is nothing more than “...an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”¹¹. What really makes one armed conflict different from another are the means used to achieve certain aims indispensable to victory. Just like the means, the aims should be adjusted to the strategic reality of the battlefield. In small wars, the brass’ obsession with annihilation can only lead to failure. “After the war, when a Vietnamese Communist was told that his side had never beaten American troops in a major battle, he replied: ‘That is correct. It is also irrelevant.’”¹² Officers educated in Western military thinking and traditions ignore the crude reality that wars are not won when one side is victorious, but when the opposite side is convinced it has lost.

I will analytically define small wars by using my own six principles of insurgency:

⁹ Peter H. Denton, “The End of Asymmetry: Force Disparity and the Aims of War”, *Canadian Military Journal*, Summer 2006, p.23.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 83.

¹² Thomas G. Paterson et al., *American Foreign Policy, a History – 1900 to Present* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1991), p.558.

- First, a small war will be won by the more mobile side, emphasizing manoeuvre over direct contact;
- Second, the outcome of a small war is not decided by a few major strategic or operational victories, but by numerous tactical successes, in fact the general is no greater than his junior officers and senior NCOs;
- Third, in small wars the logistically more independent side has more chances of winning;
- Fourth, the chances of winning a small war are directly proportional with the level of leadership decentralization within the organization engaged in the conflict;
- Fifth, in guerilla warfare maintaining the initiative and achieving surprise are synonymous;
- Sixth, the more protracted the small war, the more there is a likelihood that the outcome will be decided by factors that are beyond the control of both politicians and military forces initially involved in the conflict.

T. E. Lawrence's principles focused exclusively on the strategy and behaviour of insurgents, while mine make no distinction between the two sides. It is of paramount importance for the counter insurgency forces to understand that as long as they will not adopt the tactics of the insurgents, they will fail time and again. In small wars, there is always a predator and a prey. Western forces simply have to decide what they want to be. So far, they have been an uneasy prey, but a prey nevertheless. If eventually they choose that they want to turn into predators, they will have to conduct ourselves accordingly.

APOSTLES OF THE INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINE –THE ASSET.

In 1893, Cecil Rhodes' financial and territorial ambitions brought him into direct conflict with Lobengula, the king of Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Rich in mineral resources, the African monarch's country sparked Rhodes' interest. The numerous treaties and concessions that the British empire-builder signed with Lobengula gave the former sweeping powers over the latter. Once he realized the broad consequences of all legal ramifications included in the treaties, the angry king decided to drive the British out¹³. It was an inopportune decision.

The Battle of Shangani River, that pitted 3,000 tribal warriors against a more modest colonial force of 700, was the first in which Europeans used the Maxim gun.

"Operated by a crew of four, the 0.45 inch Maxim could fire 500 rounds a minute, fifty times faster than the fastest rifle available. A force equipped with just five of these lethal weapons could literally sweep a battlefield clear."¹⁴

Although the outcome was predictable, it exceeded all expectations. Around 1,500 Matabele warriors were slaughtered, at the cost of only four white settlers killed.

A decade before Rhodes' free reign in South African managed to antagonize the indigenous tribes, Sudan was shaken by a violent Islamic revolution. A self-proclaimed Mahdi,

¹³ Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), pp. 188-89.

¹⁴ Ibid.

the Muslim messiah, assembled a vast army of jihadists ready to kill and die for a particularly ghastly interpretation of Islam: Wahabbism. The Mahdi's agitation, including the annihilation of a 10,000 strong Egyptian army led by a retired British officer, compelled the British to send Major-General Charles George Gordon to the region. The Egyptian men under his command proved to be no match for the fanatical and numerically superior force with which they were faced. In Khartoum, they were surrounded, besieged and eventually massacred.

The defeat sent shock waves across the British Empire. In 1898, a punitive Anglo-Egyptian army led by General Herbert Horatio Kitchener was sent to Sudan. The battle took place at Omdurman, the new Sudanese capital, built across the Nile from Khartoum. The accounts differ as to the equipment of the jihadists. While Max Boot indicates that they were equipped with captured Anglo-Egyptian Martini-Henry rifles¹⁵, Niall Ferguson wrote that "...they relied on antiquated muskets, spears and swords."¹⁶

The clash was anything but a turkey shoot. In fact, the 1st British Brigade came close to being caught in a pincer and annihilated¹⁷, whilst 21st Lancers took a serious thrashing. Nevertheless, European drill and disparity in firepower originating mostly in the intelligent use of the Maxim guns (the jihadists had a few, but since their tactical approach consisted of frontal assaults, their use of the weapon did not had an impact on the outcome of the encounter) eventually proved crucial. The British under Kitchener's command won a decisive victory. "In a single morning, Mahdism had been defeated, the Sudan reconquered, Gordon avenged."¹⁸

The battles of Omdurman and Shangani River are important because they firmly established the reputation of the machine gun. The newly established universal use of the weapon would had a decisive role during the First World War.

As von Schlieffen predicted as early as 1909, the machine gun practically banished the cavalry from the battlefield¹⁹. And since the cavalry was the main element employed for operational reconnaissance, shock and mobility, its demise, along with the advent of well-equipped, conscripted armies numbering millions, precipitated the demise of manoeuvre warfare. The result was a deadly positional war that lasted four years, 1914-1918.

In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, military thinkers such as J.F.C. Fuller, Basil H. Liddell Hart, Heinz Guderian, Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky, Vladimir Triandafillov, Martel and Charles de Gaulle, to name only a few, recognized, in various degrees, the role of mechanization in the revival of manoeuvre warfare. While the overwhelming majority of historians are crediting Fuller, Liddell Hart, de Gaulle and Guderian for the theoretical crystallization of the operational doctrine which came to be known as the blitzkrieg, a closer

¹⁵ Max Boot, *War Made New, Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today* (New York: Gotham Books, 2007), p. 159.

¹⁶ Ferguson, p.225.

¹⁷ Boot, p. 165.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

¹⁹ Heinz Guderian, *Achtung Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare* (London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2000), p. 31.

analysis of their work proves that Guderian and de Gaulle were in fact the only ones that had a profound and thorough understanding of the potential of the internal combustion engine in modern warfare.

J.F.C. Fuller's *Reformation of War*, published in 1923, and *Foundation of the Science of War* (1926), are proof enough that he partially misread the lessons of the First World War. For him, future wars will be won by the side gaining tank supremacy²⁰. The tank represents for the British theorist an universal panacea to all future tactical challenges. Moreover, as heavy armour sweeps the battlefield clean, infantry and artillery were becoming, in his opinion, increasingly obsolete:

"The question now arises, what can the infantry do? These troops can do nothing outside playing the part of interested spectators. What can the gunners do? They can do next to nothing for, being distant from the field of action, upon which in a minute a tank may have changed its position by a quarter of a mile, they dare not promiscuously bombard the area; besides, in order to fire at all, they will generally have to employ direct laying, which, in most cases, will require them to be either with, or in advance of, the infantry. In such positions, as the gunners, in order to protect themselves, cannot lie flat like infantry, their pieces will soon be silenced by hostile machine gun fire."²¹

Although much more imaginative, B.H. Liddell Hart ideas, exposed in *The Remaking of Modern Armies* (1927), were still lagging far behind de Gaulle's and Guderian's. For Liddell Hart, the army's various branches were not rendered obsolete by the advent of the tank, which should, in his opinion, fulfill the traditional roles of heavy cavalry:

"The tank assault of to-morrow (sic) is but the long-awaited rebirth of the cavalry charge, with the merely material change that moving fire is added to shock and that the cavalry tank replaces the cavalry horse. Thus, to paraphrase: 'The cavalry is dead! Long live the cavalry!'"²²

Although his suggestion is not without merit, exclusively assigning to the tank the traditional role of cavalry greatly limits the tactical potential of heavy armour.

Charles de Gaulle divorced himself from Fuller's "tank à l'outrance" fixation, as well as from Liddell Hart's enthusiasm for the revival of cavalry. Unquestionably, he came closer than the two British theorists to grasping the numerous facets of blitzkrieg. The future French president predicted that the mechanization of Western armies was inevitable and it would occur on an unprecedented scale²³. Furthermore, his description of operations facilitated by the advent of the internal combustion engine is brilliant; nothing short of breathtaking if we take into account that he wrote it in the early 1930s:

"...measures must be taken to ensure that progress [of the tank] is not unduly hindered by slow mopping-up. The leading elements must therefore be used to break through and to push on towards the final objective as promptly as possible.

²⁰ J.F.C. Fuller, *The Reformation of War* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1923), p. 158.

²¹ Ibid.

²² B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Remaking of Modern Armies* (London: John Murray, 1927), p.60.

²³ Charles de Gaulle, *The Army of the Future* (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1941), p. 99.

Their supporting units will finish off what they have begun. (...) In proportion as the tanks produce their effect, so the infantry advances. Sometimes this is done on caterpillar-vehicles. Sometimes they make their way on foot. In any case, their task is to take possession of captured ground. This task is carried out by occupying successive positions, protected in depth with machine-guns, rapidly brought into action. (...) Together with the foot-soldiers, the artillery advances. Thanks to caterpillar wheels, they can push their advance as far as they wish. (...) The artillery becomes a mass movement, whose individual sections take up the positions best suited for action, and who fire from all angles at objectives which are almost continuously on the move. Provided, in addition, with anti-tank weapons and machine-guns, the artillery protects itself by its own means. Instead of immobility, map-firing and centralization, it must now learn direct observation and initiative.”²⁴

The scepticism of those still doubting Charles de Gaulle’s 1934 invention of the blitzkrieg (the year of the publication of *The Army of the Future*) will undoubtedly be dispelled by his crystal clear depiction of what is today recognized as the classical immediate aim of the lightning war:

“When one thinks of the weakness of ordinary formations as soon as they are attacked on the flank or in the rear, of the importance of certain vital parts of the organization and of centralization of command, one can estimate what overwhelming effects could be obtained by the irruption of an armoured force pouring out fire in the rear of an army in modern defence grouping. The enemy’s communications will be the most common objective of such manoeuvres.”²⁵

While de Gaulle was being publicly chastened by his superiors for the ideas exposed in his remarkable book, Guderian was working on what was to become a timeless military masterpiece: *Achtung-Panzer!* (1937). The book contains what is arguably one of the most important phrases written in the interwar period: “The engine of the Panzer is a weapon, just as the main-gun.” It represents the cornerstone of blitzkrieg.

For Guderian, the tank was so much more than the antidote, theorized by Fuller, to the machine guns, barbed wire and trenches of the First World War, it was so much more than the way, theorized by Liddell Hart, of re-instituting manoeuvre to a static battlefield; it was a means by which one could rapidly smash through enemy lines and into his rear, provoking havoc, destroying the communication and inter-communication lines, wiping out soft echelons and generally bringing mayhem to a zone that is traditionally for the troops on the front line the psychological comfort zone. The result would be disorganization, panic, loss of morale and confusion. What’s more, mechanized infantry supported by self-propelled artillery would exploit the breaches in the enemy’s line, thus giving to the opponent a coup de grâce.

But why is it that while de Gaulle was having his name removed from the promotion list after the publication of *The Army of the Future*, Guderian had Hitler’s backing in implementing the explicit and implicit ideas included in *Achtung-Panzer!*? The answer lies with the impact that the notions shaping blitzkrieg had on the British, French and respectively German army staffs. While for the French and the British the idea of lightning war was seen as revolutionary, within the framework of German military thinking, shaped over a century of constant and

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 141-143.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 149.

relentless military innovation, it was merely evolutionary²⁶. The blitzkrieg gave the classical German doctrine of encircling the enemy through a strategic offensive, but then fighting a tactical defensive battle on favourable terms to prevent the enemy breaking out of the trap, a final supreme expression.

Fuller, Liddell Hart, de Gaulle and Guderian had different appreciations of the tank. For Fuller, it represented an universal remedy, a crushing technological innovation meant to solve most challenges facing the Western military in the aftermath of the First World War. For Liddell Hart the tank restored manoeuvre to a static theatre of war by re-establishing the traditional role of cavalry on the modern battlefield. For de Gaulle and Guderian, the tank was barely the tip of the iceberg. The real novelty was the mechanization of all branches of the army with its natural corollary, inter-arms cooperation.

CONCLUSIONS

History has proven de Gaulle and Guderian right. The full potential of the tank is delivered only when it works in cooperation with mechanized infantry and self-propelled artillery under the air force's watchful eye. Moreover, to paraphrase structuralists, the genius of the two theorists was to realize that the tactical advantage of the tank outweighs the sum of its benefits: mobility, armoured protection, direct massive firepower and shock effect.

General staffs around the world ignored the axiom with catastrophic results. Tanks were deployed in urban terrain, for example, where it was assumed that they could take advantage of their armoured protection and firepower. However, because mobility was limited, they ended up, after being disabled or destroyed by various conventional or improvised anti-tank weapons, as nothing more than massive road blocks hindering the movement of troops.

During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israelis, used Fuller's "tank à l'outrance" strategy against the Arabs. The Israeli emphasis on tanks originated in their two previous success achieved in 1956 and 1968. "During these wars, and especially in 1967, fast-striking Israeli armoured columns attacked relatively static Arab formations. The half-tracks containing Israeli infantry were often left behind by faster tank units in 1967, and many infantry units never saw combat."²⁷ The interest in heavy armour as the main form of combat power overlooked anti-tank innovation in the late 1960s and early 1970s and rising training standards in both the Egyptian and the Syrian army. With the Israeli infantry almost absent from the battlefield and the IDF's artillery pieces towed, not self-propelled²⁸ (the timely deployment for the support of the rapidly advancing armour was compromised), there was no one to distract the Arab operators of anti-tank weapons. The outcome was such that, after the war, Sadat publicly

²⁶ Richard E. Simpkin, *Race to the Swift, Thoughts of Twenty-First Century Warfare* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), p. 27.

²⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman, Abraham R. Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War, Vol.1* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), p. 54.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

doubted the effectiveness of tanks in contemporary HIC29. He was, naturally, wrong. The tank is not an obsolete weapon. Its potential, however, is greatly diminished when it is not used within the operational doctrine of blitzkrieg.

The Canadian Forces recently deployed tanks in Afghanistan. Arguably, the rationale for using Leopard C2s is similar to the one that determined the Americans to keep M1 Abrams in Iraq after Saddam Hussein's military defeat: to exploit the tank's armoured protection. The simplest argument against using tanks in small wars and insurgencies was revealed by a senior Canadian officer in an interview with a journalist from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC): "...the enemy can always build a bigger bomb." In other words, in guerrilla warfare, when it comes to protection, the difference between a cab and a tank becomes relative, depending on the size of the IED used against it.

My opposition to the use of heavy armour in small wars and insurgencies stems from my scepticism in the effectiveness of tanks used outside of the operational doctrine of lightning war, as well as from my reservation to an employment of armour which does not take advantage of the sum of its benefits. Past experiences tell us that when the sum of all advantages that heavy armour brings to the battlefield could not be exploited, the result was invariably grim.

Now, I would like to focus on two characteristics of heavy armour that, according to some, makes the tank an ideal offensive tool in small wars and insurgencies: shock effect and firepower. My only question is: against whom? Guerrilla warfare is a deadly game of cat and mouse, in which the presence of mice attracts cats. In conjunction with using mobility as a force multiplier, insurgents have the ability to use the local populace as camouflage, by trying to look and act as inconspicuous as possible. They only act ordinary when they know the enemy is nearby, observing the area. Noisy, awkward, blatantly conspicuous LAVs and tanks can hardly creep up on them. Additionally, because of its weight and size, armour cannot manoeuvre with ease everywhere. In difficult terrain, and such is the case in Afghanistan, armoured vehicles use predictable routes, thus becoming the victims of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).³⁰

A long time ago, I have heard a joke that proves my point. While visiting a hospital during war, a senior officer pins medals on the chests of wounded soldiers lying in bed. One of the soldiers is completely covered in cast. When the senior officer asks him for details on the cause of his numerous fractures, the soldier replies: "Well, sir, I was chased by a tank. The gunner tried to kill me, but since the terrain was covered with shell holes, I managed to use them as cover. I hid there until the gunner used up all his shells; then, I ran into a forest, with the tank still after me. The commander tried to kill me using the tank's machine gun. I hid behind trees

²⁹ Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 250.

³⁰ In an essay published in 1972, Jacques Derrida, the father of deconstructivism, argued that the key to understanding Phaedrus, Plato's dialogue, is pharmakon. The term does not have an exact English translation: in Greek, it can mean either poison or remedy. The use of armour as combat power is, similarly, a pharmakon: it can be either poison or remedy according to how and in what context in which it is used.

until he expended all his ammunition. Then, they tried to crush me under the tracks, but I ran in circles until the tank's gas tank was dry." "What happened then?" anxiously asked the senior officer. "Well, sir, the driver came out and beat me to a bloody pulp with a wrench".

G. Gabriel Serbu received a master's degree in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. In January 2007, he will begin basic infantry officer training at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec.

THE POWER OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

Erik Evans

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This paper is divided into two sections. The first section is presented as a fictional portrayal, written in the first person, of a Maoist lecture on the political/military power that is produced by political mobilization. The second section entitled “Lessons for Counter-Revolutionary War” is written in non-fiction third person and elaborates on the concepts presented in the first section from a counter-insurgency perspective.

The setting for the following fictional Maoist lecture takes place at a meeting of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM). RIM is an actual umbrella organization for Maoist movements worldwide dedicated to spreading revolution through People's War. ¹ The presenter of the lecture, a leading Maoist political figure, instructs his colleagues on how political mobilization will generate revolutionary power.

As the reader peruses the first section of this paper he or she might want to ask these type of questions:

- “Could the Maoist concept of a United Front be applied to uniting the sectarian factions in Iraq against the insurgency?”
- “Could the Maoist critique of roving bandits apply to insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan?”
- “Could the Maoist idea of conducting political mobilization work amongst the enemy be used to compel insurgents in Iraq to defect?”

THE (FICTIONAL) REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONALIST MOVEMENT

We are here in this forum to discuss the role of political mobilization in revolutionary warfare. The objective of political mobilization is to transform the masses into an unstoppable weapon. Chairman Mao Tse-Tung taught us that people, not weapons, are the decisive factor in revolutionary warfare. He stated that, “the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons.”² Yet many have proclaimed that advanced weapons and technology decide everything in war. This simple-minded militarist position is detrimental to the revolutionary cause. In 1944, Comrade Mao remarked that Chinese resistance against Japan must change, “the policy of solely depending upon weaponry to associating weapons with people.”³ The people are the weapon. Political mobilization turns the people into a rabid dog that tears, shreds and rips apart the counter-revolutionary enemy. Clausewitz referenced the

¹ See “Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement,” http://www.awtw.org/rim/declaration_eng.htm

² Mao Tse-Tung, “Talk with Anna Louise Strong,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: The Third Revolutionary Civil War Period* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001) 100.

³ Mao, “Crisis Arising From the Fall of Changsha” *Collected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (1917-1949), Vol. 7-10*, (Arlington: Joint Publications Research Service, 1978) 164.

political and military energy produced by political mobilization of the masses when he described Prussia's rise against Napoleon. Clausewitz noted that Prussia, "made the war a concern of the people, and with half her former population, without money or credit, she mobilized a force twice as large she had in 1806."¹ That is the power of political mobilization. Prussia brought forth her greatest army, from a deteriorated and weakened state, by mobilizing the masses for war. The energy of the masses infused the Prussian war machine with the power necessary to challenge Napoleon's armies.

What other method can bring a people on its knees, begging for mercy, to a position of revolutionary strength? Only political mobilization can accomplish such a feat. Political mobilization channels the energy of the masses into the revolution. It raises the political consciousness of the people and makes them realize they are the weapon of revolution.

We live in an era where weapons and modern armies, by themselves, cannot bring victory in battle.² The power of the masses must be tapped into or else the revolution will fail. Political mobilization produces revolutionary victory by bringing the people back into the fold of war.

Social grievances, foreign invasion, economic oppression, failure of the state structure, ideological fervor etc...have all been referenced as principal causes of revolution. The aforementioned causes are not enough to galvanize a population into full blown revolutionary war. The political power and ire of the people has to be organized and provoked through political mobilization before a successful revolution can foster itself.

Chairman Mao wrote, "A national revolutionary war as great as ours cannot be won without extensive and thoroughgoing political mobilization."³ The people will remain inert without political mobilization. In an analogy explaining this problem Chairman Mao stated, "Bells don't ring till you strike them. Tables don't move till you shift them."⁴ The revolution, no matter its cause, has to be politically organized and mobilized.

A neutral population is never beneficial to a revolutionary cause. Deng Xiaoping remarked that even if the people, "oppose the enemy but remain neutral towards us, this will only benefit the enemy."⁵ The neutral masses do not channel any energy into the revolution. Mao chastised the Chinese people who considered resistance, "to be solely the task of the Red Army, while they themselves sit by and hope for a Red Army victory."⁶ The masses must be educated in the fact that they are the main weapon of the revolution. Our Vietnamese comrade Truong Chinh in

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited by Peter Paret and M. Howard, (New York: Knopf, 1993) 716.

² Mao, "Basic Tactics," http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_28.htm#ch15

³ Mao, "Urgent Tasks Following KMT-CPC Co-operation," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001) 154.

⁴ Mao, "Present Situation and Our Tasks," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: The Third Revolutionary Civil War Period* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001) 20.

⁵ Deng Xiaoping, "A General Account of the Struggle Against the Enemy Over the Past Five Years," *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 1*, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol1/text/a1050.html>

⁶ Mao, "On Mobilization for War and the Style of Work" *Collected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (1917-1949), Vol. 3* (Arlington: Joint Publications Research Service, 1978) 121.

The Resistance Will Win also warned us on how dangerous an indifferent population is to a revolutionary movement.¹ Political mobilization corrects the problem of a neutral population. It pushes the masses from a state of neutrality to a state of revolution.

A revolutionary movement must understand the correct relationship between politics and war in order to implement political mobilization. Lenin, in analyzing Clausewitz, found that politics is the key to grasping the nature of war. He stated, “War is the continuation of politics by other (i.e. violent) means. This famous aphorism was uttered by one of the profoundest writers on the problems of war, Clausewitz. Marxists have always rightly regarded this thesis as the theoretical basis of views concerning the significance of every given war.”² War is a continuation of politics by other means. This is the correct thesis of war.

Chairman Mao condemned those militarists who say, “We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.”³ These simple-minded militarists believe weapons and military action are everything in war. They reject the role of politics in war and refuse to politically mobilize the masses. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and his bandit gang, the Kuomintang, were such militarists.

They espoused these ridiculous claims, “We can only win with modern weapons” or “We lose because we lack modern weapons.” Mao remarked that, “If this kind of ‘weapons only’ theory is followed constantly, China’s battlefronts will only continue to deteriorate.”⁴ Fortunately, Chairman Mao reversed this militarist nonsense by developing a political goal and political mobilization program that harnessed the energy of the Chinese masses.

Chairman Mao argued that the essence of war is determined by its political goal.⁵ The political goal of the revolution stings the consciousness of the masses and stirs them from their subjugated slumber. Mao stated that the political goal of the Chinese revolution against Japan was, “to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality.”⁶ Political mobilization was the mechanism through which this political goal came to fruition. A strong political goal, through political mobilization, arouses the political consciousness of the masses and awakens their prowess for war.

A human’s martial prowess emanates from his political consciousness. It does not emanate from the weapon that he carries. Chairman Gonzalo of Sendero Luminoso said, “Modern weapons are necessary, but their performance depends on the ideology of the man who wields them.”⁷ The weapon is only an extension of the mind. A soldier with a weak mind

¹ Truong Chinh, *Primer for Revolt: The Communist Takeover of Vietnam*, (New York: Praeger, 1963) 207.

² Vladimir Lenin, *Socialism and War*, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/s+w/>

³ Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1961) 89.

⁴ Mao, “Crisis Arising From the Fall of Changsha,” 162.

⁵ Mao, “Essential Points of Speech on Second Imperialist War,”” *Collected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (1917-1949), Vol. 7-10*, (Arlington: Joint Publications Research Service, 1978) 16.

⁶ Mao, “On Protracted War,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001) 155.

⁷ Abimael Guzman as quoted in “Interview with Chairman Gonzalo” http://www.blythe.org/peru-ppc/docs_en/interv.htm Chairman Gonzalo was the leader of the Peruvian Maoist organization Sendero

will perform poorly no matter what advanced weapon he holds in his hands. Deng Xiaoping remarked, “our soldiers should not only have weapons in their hands but, more important, they should also be armed mentally.”¹ A revolutionary political consciousness arms the soldier mentally by increasing his martial creativity and political motivation.

Chairman Mao said, “there is a great creative power among the people and there are thousands of geniuses among them. There are geniuses in every village, every town and every city.”² Revolutionary political mobilization brings the creativity of the masses into war. It destroys reactionary political structures that suppress the revolutionary consciousness of the masses.

New ways of war are generated once the collective revolutionary consciousness of the masses is allowed to flourish without restraint. Clausewitz observed this phenomena in the French Revolution. He noted that the mobilization of the French people, “set in motion new means and new forces, and have thus made possible a degree of energy in war that otherwise would have been inconceivable.”³

Lenin also commented on the creative energies of the masses unlocked by the French Revolution. He stated that France showed its, “revolutionary creativeness when it remodeled its whole system of strategy, broke with all the old rules and traditions of warfare, replaced the old troops with a new revolutionary people’s army, and created new methods of warfare.”⁴ Orthodox methods of war fall by the wayside once the revolutionary consciousness of the masses has been unleashed.

The revolutionary political consciousness is not confined by rigid military rules and formulations. It has broken free from the constrictive structures of doctrinaire military thought, politics and society that stymie man’s inherent genius for war. The revolutionary political consciousness is an inquisitive one. It does not fight in fixed patterns. It utilizes all ways to destroy the enemy. Any object or action that can defeat the enemy is employed.⁵

Innovative ideas are the hallmark of the revolutionary political consciousness. Innovation comes to the revolutionary soldier because he operates in the moment of battle. He does not live in the past and attempt to refight previous wars. Comrade Deng said, “The purpose of learning from the past is to improve future work, not to do mechanically what was possible in the past.”⁶ The revolutionary political consciousness learns from history but is not bound by the traditions of history.

Luminoso/Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) before his capture in 1992.

¹ Deng, “Mobilize New Recruits and Conduct Political Work Among Them,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 1*, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol1/text/a1010.html>

² Mao as quoted in James Mrazek, *The Art of Winning Wars*, (New York: Walker and Company, 1968) 3.

³ Clausewitz, 737.

⁴ Lenin, “War and Revolution,” *Lenin Collected Works Vol. 24*, www.bellum.nu/literature/lenin002.html

⁵ Mao, “Basic Tactics.”

⁶ Deng, “The Establishment of Base Areas and the Mass Movement,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 1*, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol1/text/a1070.html>

The revolutionary guerrilla's high degree of political motivation is another source of his innovation. He knows the political goal of the revolution and the strenuous efforts that it will take to realize that goal. The revolutionary soldier is motivated to create new ideas and tactics that will bring the political goal closer to realization. Political motivation gives him the tenacity to see his innovative ideas through to the end.¹

Lin Piao noted the creativity shown by revolutionary guerrilla armies against professional militaries.² He stated, "Guerrilla forces have ultimately defeated regular armies. "Amateurs" who were never trained in any military schools have eventually defeated "professionals" graduated from military academies."³ Soldiers trained in these military academies are often constrained by orthodox military thought and formulaic battle plans. These soldiers lack the initiative, political motivation and freedom of action necessary to win revolutionary war.

General Chin T'ienjung noted this constrictive doctrinaire thought process in the Japanese infantry. Chin said, "The Japanese infantry fights by the drill book. When the drill-book instructions don't work, they are lost."⁴ The Japanese, although devoted to their cause of subjugating China, were weak minded. Their infantry fought by rote and when their formulaic battle plans did not work, they were helpless.⁵ The revolutionary guerrilla is never fixated or reliant on a fixed formula of war or weapon system. His political consciousness easily overcomes failure by adapting to the chaotic nature of war.

There are those that will say, "What about the sixteen character formula of the Red Army?" The sixteen character formula is, "When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy camps, we harass; when the enemy tires, we attack; when the enemy withdraws, we pursue."⁶ There is great flexibility within the sixteen character formula. It does not promote fixed patterned attacks nor does it demand rigid obedience. There were times when the Red Army abandoned the formulation, "when the enemy advances, we retreat," and adopted the formula, "when the enemy advances, we advance."⁷ The revolutionary soldier knows that the sixteen character formula is a way to defeat the enemy but not the only way.

Political indoctrination develops soldiers that can outfight an enemy with a better military education, more modern weapons and larger forces. This is one of the reasons why political work must be emphasized in the military. Jeh Peh-hsi, political director of the Eighth Route Army (Red Army) stated, "Political work is the life line of the army and the heart and soul of our

¹ Mrazek, 137.

² For a full treatment on the idea of a creativity gap between guerrilla armies and conventional armies see, Mrazek, 125-141.

³ Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War" http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/ch09.htm

⁴ Chin T'ienjung as quoted in Evans Carlson, *Twin Stars of China* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2003) 124.

⁵ Carlson, 27.

⁶ Mao as quoted in Victor Corpus, *Silent War* (Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, 1989) 61.

⁷ Deng, "A General Account of the Struggle Against the Enemy Over the Past Five Years."

resistance to the [Japanese] invasion. Our weapons are antiquated and inferior, but we can compensate for this handicap by emphasizing political indoctrination.”¹

Clausewitz noted that transformations in war are the result of political transformations.² Political mobilization transformed the political consciousness and political structure of China. China was weak and humbled when Japan invaded it. The old Chinese adage that a “good man does not join the army” was pervasive amongst the masses.³ The peasant farmer knew only how to toil his lands. He did not know how to resist the Japanese invader.⁴

It was only through constant and patient political mobilization that China changed from a society that discouraged men from becoming soldiers to a society that championed the cause of revolutionary warfare. It was through political mobilization that the peasant farmer learned to destroy his oppressors.

China brought forth her greatest army from a weakened state through political mobilization. So how is it that so many revolutionaries have shown disdain for political mobilization? Political mobilization is a long and arduous process. The people will not automatically gravitate to the political goal. They have to be slowly and patiently educated in the political goal before they will join the revolution. Revolutionaries who seek quick victory over the counter-revolutionary enemy have no patience for political mobilization. They seek quick victory by placing an undue emphasis on military action, urban insurrectionism, advanced weapons and other notions of adventurism.

Revolutionaries in the past fell under the dangerous spell of Soviet socialist revisionism that worshiped sophisticated weaponry and quick victory. The vestiges of Soviet revisionism still haunt us today in the 21st century. The Soviets believed in winning a quick victory over the Western imperialism by dominating the initial period of a nuclear war through pre-emptive striking.⁵ Whereas Mao saw that capitalist imperialism can only be destroyed through protracted warfare.⁶

The Soviet revisionist strategy of high technology, rapid offensive movement and nuclear weapons never offered any guidance to revolutionaries. Comrade Lin Piao chastised Soviet revisionism in his seminal speech, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War.” He said that Soviet revisionism, “ignores the human factor and sees only the material factor and which regards technique as everything and politics as nothing.”⁷ We reject the idea that material factors or

¹ Jeh Peh-hsi as quoted in Carlson, 68.

² Clausewitz, 737.

³ Deng, “Mobilize New Recruits and Conduct Political Work Among Them.”

⁴ Wang Yu-Chuan, “The Organization of A Typical Guerrilla Area in South Shantung” Carlson, 92.

⁵ V.D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy* (New Jersey: Republished by RAND, 1963) 308.

⁶ For a review of the Soviet-Chinese debate over the nature of revolutionary war See COL William F. Scott, “The Contrast in Chinese and Soviet Military Doctrines,” *Air University Review*, January-February 1968 www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1968/jan-feb/scott.html

⁷ Lin Piao “Long Live the Victory of People’s War.”

weapons are the decisive factor in war. The people are the weapon. We reject the idea that politics is nothing. Politics is everything.

The Soviet revisionists rejected the power of the masses. Lin Piao noted, “The Khrushchev revisionists insist that a nation without nuclear weapons is incapable of defeating an enemy with nuclear weapons, whatever methods of fighting it may adopt.”¹ A weak people can defeat a stronger power with nuclear weapons through political mobilization or People’s War. They do not need advanced technology or nuclear weapons to win revolutionary war. We have already stated the evidence for this fact.

Our comrades of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) gave a lucid description of those revolutionaries who damn patient political mobilization:

In the wish to hasten revolutionary victory, spontaneous uprisings of the masses is actually rated higher than steady and solid organizing of a proletarian revolutionary party and other revolutionary forces. The premium is put on sweeping propaganda, street activism, transport paralisation by armed units and other dramatic acts of violence rather than on painstaking mass work.²

Many revolutionaries believe in the theory of spontaneous masses. This theory holds that the masses will spontaneously arise in revolution after spectacular acts of violence, urban street fighting, terrorism or even peaceful protesting. This is foolish adventurism. Wishful thinking and fanciful theories of quick victory have no place in revolutionary war.

Chairman Mao rightly concluded that it is only through a protracted war of the masses that a beleaguered people can defeat a stronger counter-revolutionary force. Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap commented on the importance of political mobilization during the first phases of a protracted war. He wrote of the French-Indochinese war, “In the early years, as the political movement of the masses was not strong enough and the enemy’s forces still stable, the political mobilization among the masses had all the more to be considered as the main task, for the preparation of armed insurrection.”³

It is critical that political and military power be built through political mobilization before significant operations against the counter-revolutionary force take place. The momentum of revolutionary war is weakened when the vital stages of political mobilization are bypassed.

Our comrades of the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) also give further insight into adventuress revolutionaries who deny the power of political mobilization:

They pay homage to weapons and reject the protracted and systematic political work among the masses (especially the peasantry), favoring guerrilla “*focos*” for the auctioning of wandering armed bands. They cultivate spontaneity, initiating the

¹ Lin Piao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War.”

² Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) Document, “Five Kinds of Insurrectionism,” February 24, 1992, <http://www.philippinerevolution.net/cgi-bin/cpp/pdocs.pl?id=insue:page=01>

³ Vo Nguyen Giap, “People’s War, People’s Army,” (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001) 78.

military activities without considering the political conditions and the subjective desire of the masses (acting above the conscience of the masses.)¹

This PCP statement points to the danger of roving guerrilla bands like those favored by Cubanism in revolutionary war.² These guerrilla bands are called roving guerrillas because they practice only mobile guerrilla war wandering through the countryside or city on hit and destroy missions. Chairman Mao wrote, “History knows many peasant wars of the “roving rebel” type, but none of them ever succeeded.”³ The roving rebel will be destroyed, despite all of his elusiveness and cunning, because he does not establish base areas. The base area is a strategic necessity for revolutionary war.

The base area serves as a defensive and offensive platform to consolidate and expand the political power of the revolution. Self-defense militias mass organizations, the Party and other mechanisms of political mobilization all function within the base area. Political power is produced and consolidated within the base area through continuous political mobilization of the masses. Offensive political and military operations are launched from base areas into guerrilla zones (areas not controlled by revolutionary forces) to expand the revolution.

The roving guerrilla has no concept of base areas because he is not interested in building political power through political work. He believes that his military operations will either topple the reactionary or cause the masses to spontaneously arise in revolution. So he has no need for base areas to consolidate or expand power. That is the romantic ideal of guerrilla warfare. We are not romantics. All manifestations of roving guerrillas must be eliminated.⁴

We will briefly mention Muslim resistance movements here for a few reasons. Islamic popular resistance has continued to prove Mao’s precepts that a nuclear power can be challenged and defeated by mobilizing the masses. Within Islamic resistance there are those who have advocated some kind of political mobilization and those who have advocated simple-minded armed adventurism. An short examination of this dichotomy in Islamic resistance will further illustrate our discussion on political mobilization.

Islamic revolutionaries have proven that they can challenge a nuclear power by mobilizing the masses for a protracted war. Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hizbullah, recognized the power of the masses. He said:

I say to the Government that on this juncture you have to get close to the people in particular, the deprived and the poor and the needy and the people who live in the slums because during the hard times you will find that the people of those areas are

¹ Communist Party of Peru Document, “Latin America: Great Victories and Brilliant Perspectives,” *Bandera Roja Magazine* No. 42, Voice of the Central Committee of the PCP, May 1970. http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp/docs_en/latin-1.htm

² Cubanism refers to the style of guerrilla warfare advocated by Che Guevara that placed emphasis on armed action to mobilize the masses. See Abimael Guzman, “Interview with Chairman Gonzalo.”

³ Mao, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan*, (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001) 94.

⁴ Mao, “Resolution of the Ninth CCP Congress of the Red Fourth Army,” *Collected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (1917-1949)*, Vol. 1-2 (Arlington: Joint Publications Research Service, 1978) 173.

ready more than any other to sacrifice and give their blood for the sake of this country and the nation.”¹

HAMAS is an organization that has recognized the power of the masses. A HAMAS political leader recognized that resistance cannot be won through simple-minded armed struggle alone. He said, “First, resistance does not mean only military action, but it is also the social work, the political work and so on. In our program, we adopt all of these forms of resistance that can go in parallel ways...”²

Conversely there are Islamic groups that have concentrated on armed adventurism hoping for spontaneous uprisings. The leadership of Egyptian Gama’ a Islamiyya has accused Al-Qaeda of this type of simple-minded militarism. A summary of Gama’ a Islamiyya’s argument from their book “The Strategy and Bombings of Al-Qaeda” is as follows:

An analysis of Al-Qa’ida’s strategy shows it is based on choosing one road to resolve the conflicts in which it entangled itself. This road is that of force only. It does not come to an end except after shedding the last drop of blood of its followers. This rigid reliance on one single strategy does not bring the flexibility that is needed to attain the aspired goals.³

Parallel contradictions exist within Marxist and Islamic resistance movements. There are those who favor mobilization of the masses through political work and those who favor military work over political work.

We have discussed at length those revolutionaries who deny the power of political mobilization. These armed revisionists are dangerous for two main reasons. First they prevent the implementation of political mobilization. Second they give the counter-revolutionary an opportunity to destroy the revolution. The counter-revolutionary enemy does not always toe the militarist line. He can also understand that war is an extension of politics and implement his own form of People’s War.

Mao stated that at one point Chiang Kai-Shek and the American imperialists were beginning to understand the importance of the political struggle. He wrote,

“Precisely because they realize that the country wide victory of the Chinese people’s war of liberation can no longer be prevented by a purely military struggle, they are placing more and more importance each day on political struggle.”⁴

¹ Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, “Speech of Hizbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah” 3-13-2003 http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.htm

² Abu Anas as quoted in, “Interview with Vice Chairman of Hamas Parliamentary Bloc,” May 21, 2006. <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=4500>

³ “Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy: Part 1 of Book Review,” *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, Sunday, January 11, 2004

http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:cuGHFuSYzgAJ:www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ig_bk.htm+%22Egyptian+Islamist+Leaders+Fault+Al-Qa’ida’s+Strategy%22+&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1

⁴ Mao, “Carry the Revolution Through to the End,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: The Third Revolutionary Civil War Period* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001) 301.

The Chinese People's War was strong and it crushed Chiang Kai-Shek's efforts in the political struggle. However, we must recognize that the counter-revolutionary enemy can use political mobilization to challenge revolutionary movements. Our comrades in the CPP recognized that "counter revolutionaries have adopted and successfully implemented some kind of "people's war" based on tribal and religious anticommunist mass loyalty as in the use of the Unita in Angola, the Renamo in Mozambique, the mujaheddins in Afghanistan and the Contras in Nicaragua."¹

When we do not implement political mobilization we face the grave danger that the counter-revolutionary force will. Armed revisionists in the CPP hurt the revolutionary struggle by concentrating on armed adventurism rather than on painstaking mass work.

The AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) developed their own version of People's War and built a mass base amongst the people. The AFP employed Special Operation Teams (SOTs) to destroy the CPP's political infrastructure and political mobilization capability.² The CPP response to the SOTs was hampered by the armed revisionists and urban insurrectionists.³ This resulted in critical damage to the CPP's infrastructure and mass base.

The counter-revolutionary enemy will only be defeated when the people's political power is established. The Maoist revolutionary understands that the people are the main weapon of the revolution. This is why propaganda work is the foremost task of a revolutionary army.⁴ Political propaganda and agitation is not just the job of a special political department.⁵ Each soldier is charged with politically energizing the masses. Chairman Mao concluded that a revolutionary army, "definitely does not exist merely for the sake of fighting. Besides fighting, it must also shoulder such important tasks as agitating, organizing, arming and helping the masses, and building political power."⁶

The revolutionary army must have harmonious relations with the masses in order to politically mobilize them. In the past, armies in China developed a habit of mistreating the populace and stealing from them.⁷ The Chinese Red Army created a system of rules to ensure that trust could be built between the soldiers and the masses. This system of rules is called "Three Rules and Eight Remarks." The Three Rules and Eight Remarks during the anti-Japanese campaign were:

Three Rules: 1) Execute the anti-Japanese patriotic principles 2) Execute the instructions of leaders 3) Don't take the smallest thing from the people. Eight Remarks: 1) Soldiers must ask permission before entering a house. Before leaving, the occupants must be thanked for their hospitality, and they must be asked if they

¹ CPP, "Five Kinds of Insurrectionism."

² CPP, "Five Kinds of Insurrectionism." See Corpus, 190-191 for details on AFP SOTS.

³ CPP, "Five Kinds of Insurrectionism."

⁴ Mao, "Resolution of the Ninth CCP Congress of the Red Fourth Army," 180.

⁵ Mao, "Report of the Ching-Kang Mountains Front Committee to Central Authority," *Collected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (1917-1949), Vol. 1-2* (Arlington: Joint Publications Research Service, 1978) 140.

⁶ Mao, "Resolution of the Ninth CCP Congress of the Red Fourth Army," 166.

⁷ Jeh Peh-hsi as quoted in Carlson, 70.

are satisfied with the condition of the house 2) Keep the house clean 3) Speak kindly to the people 4) Pay for all you use, at the market price, 5) Return all borrowed articles 6) Pay for all things which are broken or destroyed 7) Never commit a nuisance 8) Do not kill or mistreat prisoners.¹

This is an example of the Three Rules and Eight Remarks during the anti-Japanese phase of the Sino-Japanese war. The rules will change somewhat according to the circumstance of each revolution, particularly the political goal. These rules will create a trustful rapport with the people. Strict discipline by the revolutionary soldier is one of the surest ways to win the confidence of the masses. Many times the counter-revolutionary armies are undisciplined and they hurt the people. The masses will choose the disciplined revolutionary fighter over the undisciplined counter-revolutionary.

A critical distinction must be made between establishing political power amongst the masses versus merely winning the trust or support of the masses.² Repairing a man's house after it has been destroyed in an enemy artillery barrage will win you his heart, but that action by itself will not build his political consciousness. Simply repairing a man's house will not unleash his martial creativity. You must tie the action of repairing the man's house with the political goal of the revolution in order to build his political consciousness. After you repair the man's house, you must explain that the counter-revolutionary army will destroy his house again unless he stands up and fights. You must make that man understand the political goal and how the revolution can provide him with the means of realizing that goal. That is political mobilization. That is building political power. This same man will now pick up a knife or a rifle and kill the enemy before his house is destroyed again. This same man will go out and politically mobilize another ten men who in turn will mobilize another hundred. As Mao said, "A small spark can start a prairie fire."³

All classes of people must be brought into a United Front against the counter-revolutionary enemy. This means creating a political program that can galvanize different classes of people into a revolutionary alliance. Lin Piao succinctly explained the importance of the United Front, "In order to win a people's war, it is imperative to build the broadest possible united front and formulate a series of policies which will ensure the fullest mobilization of the basic masses..."⁴ The creation of a United Front will bring the full energy of the masses into effect.

The Red Army's political work with the Muslims serves as an example for us on how to bring divergent peoples into a United Front alliance. During the anti-Japanese war the Chinese Red Army did extensive political work amongst the Muslim masses. Chairman Mao wrote to the Muslims, "We wish to rally all armed strengths of the Moslems and to help and develop them.

¹ Jeh Peh-hsi as quoted in Carlson, 69-70.

² See Mao, "Letter to Comrade Lin Piao," *Collected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (1917-1949), Vol. 1-2* (Arlington: Joint Publications Research Service, 1978) 197-206 for a discussion on the concept of winning the support of the masses vs. building power amongst the masses.

³ Mao, 201.

⁴ Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War."

We wish to arm the Moslems and form an independent Moslem Resist–Japan Army.”¹ The Red Army was able to bring the Muslims into a United Front through political work and strict discipline.

The Red Army adapted some of the Three Rules and Eight Remarks to the Muslim’s particular cultural situation. These adapted rules were noted by a journalist traveling with the Red Army. He wrote, “Red soldiers must not: enter the home of a Moslem without his consent; molest a mosque or a priest in any way; say pig or dog before Moslems, or ask them why they don’t eat pork; or call the Moslems “small faith” and the Chinese “big faith.”²

The Red Army’s strict discipline and political work heightened the revolutionary consciousness of the Chinese Muslims and brought them into a United Front against Japan. The Red Army built political power amongst the Chinese Muslim masses making them realize they were the main weapon of revolution. A revolutionary movement must conduct hard political work amongst all classes in order to bring them into a United Front against the counter–revolutionary enemy.

Jen Peh–his described the three main components of political mobilization: (1) Education within the army, (2) Work among the civil populace and (3) Work among the enemy.³ We have already discussed the first two. Work amongst the enemy is an overlooked component of political mobilization. A revolution must shatter enemy propaganda that says, “Communist bandits kill anyone in sight.”⁴ We do this by releasing enemy soldiers and treating their wounded. We hold political discussions with prisoners and other reactionaries to win them to our side.⁵

Deng Xiaoping commented on winning over reactionary landlords, “We should combine the struggle against feudal landlords with the effort to win them over. That is to say, while struggling against them, we should try to draw them nearer to us; and vice versa.”⁶ Winning reactionaries over to our side is much better than killing them. Violence against reactionaries is inevitable but we should keep the violence to a minimum.

Mao said, “Reactionaries must be suppressed, but killing without discrimination is strictly forbidden; the fewer the killings, the better.”⁷ He further commented that, “killing without discrimination is entirely wrong; this would only cause our Party to forfeit sympathy, become

¹ Mao, “Declaration of the Soviet Central Government to the Moslem People,” *Collected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (1917-1949)*, Vol. 5-6 (Arlington: Joint Publications Research Service, 1978) 36.

² Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, (New York: Grove Press, 1944) 353.

³ Jen Peh-hsi as quoted in Carlson, 68.

⁴ Mao, “Report of the Ching-Kang Mountains Front Committee to Central Authority,” 140.

⁵ For a short description of political work amongst Japanese POWS see Carlson, 71 and 197.

⁶ Deng, “The Establishment of Base Areas and the Mass Movement.”

⁷ Mao, “Essential Points in Land Reform in the New Liberated Areas,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: The Third Revolutionary Civil War Period*, (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001) 201.

alienated from the masses and fall into isolation.”¹ Indiscriminate killing can divorce the masses from the revolution.

There must always be a political explanation for the killing of reactionaries. It is best when the masses themselves are able to condemn reactionaries in public trials.² Public trials help mobilize the population against the counter-revolutionary enemy and prevent indiscriminate killing.

Chairman Mao championed violence and illegal methods against reactionaries when appropriate. He wrote in 1928 that, “considerable work has been done in unleashing the masses in guerrilla uprisings to kill the landlords, with much success.”³ He also wrote, “Although the attacks by the peasants on the local bullies and rotten gentry in the villages have used illegal methods, these are methods which must be adopted in the course of revolutionary struggle.”⁴ We must keep in mind that violence is only correct when it is done to further the political goal of the revolution.⁵

We will summarize our long discussion on the role of political mobilization in revolutionary war with a quote from Lin Piao’s speech, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War.” He stated:

The essence of Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s theory of army building is that in building a people’s army prominence must be given to politics, *i.e.*, the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of our army. True, a people’s army must pay attention to the constant improvement of its weapons and equipment and its military technique, but in its fighting it does not rely purely on weapons and technique, it relies mainly on politics, on the proletarian revolutionary consciousness and courage of the commanders and fighters, on the support and backing of the masses.⁶

Political mobilization will bring revolutionary movements from a state of weakness to a state of power by unleashing the fury of the masses. As Giap told us, “Revolutionary theory is translated into invincible strength once it has gripped the masses.”⁷ The political goal of the revolution is given life and unassailable power once it has taken hold of the people.

Editor’s Note – end of the RIM meeting, back to non-fiction.

¹ Mao, “Important Problems of the Party’s Present Policy,” 186.

² Mao, 186.

³ Mao, “Report of the Ching-Kang Mountains Front Committee to Central Authority,” 132.

⁴ Mao, “Declaration of the First Hunan Peasant Congress,” *Collected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (1917-1949), Vol. 1-2* (Arlington: Joint Publications Research Service, 1978) 112.

⁵ For a discussion on the role of terror and violence in Maoist revolutionary war, see Thomas Marks *Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam*. (London: Frank Cass, 1996) 151-169.

⁶ Lin Piao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War.”

⁷ Giap, “The South Vietnam People Will Win,” Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001. 36

LESSONS FOR COUNTER–REVOLUTIONARY WAR:

(1) DON'T RELY ON SPONTANEOUS MASSES

Counter–insurgency forces cannot expect the people to rise up and spontaneously support them any more than a revolutionary insurgency can. The people must be politically organized against the revolution. Noted counter–insurgency analyst David Galula wrote, “The support from the population is not spontaneous, and in any case must be organized.”¹

(2) DESTROY THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The political infrastructure and base areas of a revolutionary movement are used to mobilize the masses. Destroying the political infrastructure or base areas of an insurgency is a key strategy in defeating revolutionary political mobilization efforts. General Victor Corpus of the AFP noted the reason for concentrating on destroying the political infrastructure of the CPP:

It is noticed that in previous military undertaking against the communist insurgents, the emphasis lay on the elimination of the armed elements, with body counts serving as the gauge for success. On the other hand, the enemy political structures in the barangays remain practically untouched and intact. The destruction of the enemy political structure is not given due attention. But these political structures in the barangays are what the enemy uses to mobilize the people in support of the insurgents' cause...² (barangays=town/district)

(3) THE ROLE OF INSURGENT DISCIPLINARY STANDARDS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The counter–insurgency force must uphold the highest disciplinary standards in order to undercut popular support for a revolutionary movement that has already established strict disciplinary standards for its own fighters.

Al–Qaeda commander Abu–Hajar Abd–al–Aziz al–Muqrin argued that Al–Qaeda fighters must be known for their good character in order to gain the support of the people. He stated that, “The troops must be marked by their good manners and conduct. A mujahid must serve as a beacon to lighten the road for the people and a model for other colleagues to follow.”³ Al–Muqrin's logic of strict disciplinary standards towards the civilian population seems paradoxical given Al–Qaeda's penchant for gruesome and murderous acts of violence.

Mao and al–Muqrin both insisted upon high disciplinary standards for revolutionary fighters in order to win over the population and prevent indiscriminate violence that would alienate popular support. Sir Robert Thompson noted that, “Terror is more effective when it is selective. This allows the communists' behavior towards the people as a whole to be good, and strict discipline is used to enforce it.”⁴ Selective violence combined with strict disciplinary

¹ David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958*, (Rand Monograph, 2006) 417. www.rand.org

² Corpus, 190-191.

³ Abu-Hajar Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin as quoted in Michael Sheuer, “Al-Qaeda Doctrine: Training the Individual Warrior,” *Terrorism Focus*, Vol.3, Issue 12, <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369944>

⁴ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, (New York: Praeger, 1966) 25.

standards allows the revolutionary movement to ruthlessly kill its enemies and gain popular support at the same time.

Violence against civilians has to be couched in the political rhetoric of the revolution to make it justifiable. The insurgency faces problems when it can no longer justify its violent actions. In 1996, Al-Qaeda condemned the massacres of civilians by the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA).¹ The extreme violence of the GIA had, in Al-Qaeda's opinion, estranged the GIA from the people and prevented it from establishing an Islamic state. The violence of the GIA was no longer politically explainable to the Algerian people.

Al-Qaeda's admonitions against indiscriminate terror appear to apply in localized environments where it seeks to establish power. There are no such admonitions against attacking Western targets.

(4) THE PEOPLE ARE THE WEAPON

The people are an energy source for the counter-insurgency. An energy source that can infuse the counter-insurgency program with ideas, intelligence, fighters, material and martial creativity. A counter-insurgency campaign can regenerate itself, bring itself from the brink of defeat, by mobilizing the people for war. Thomas Marks noted that citizen militias organized and supported by the Philippine armed forces, "...became the ultimate Maoist nightmare: the people armed and numerous."²

The people who refuse to be persuaded by Maoist political indoctrination can become targets for assassination. A Filipino man remarked that the people could do nothing to stop the violence of the Maoist CPP because, "we had no arms."³ An alienated and distraught population that has been cowed by the violence of an insurgency will be of no help to the counter-insurgency force unless it is politically organized and given the means to protect itself.

The people, from a Maoist perspective, are first and foremost a weapon. The Nepalese Maoist Leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka Prachanda) stated, "A poor village woman with a gun feels her life as a woman has been elevated."⁴ The poor village woman is politically indoctrinated before she is given a weapon. Her political consciousness is aroused and a metaphysical political bond is created between her and the revolutionary movement. Once her political consciousness is aroused the poor village woman is willing dedicate her life, her material wealth and creative energy to the revolution.

North Vietnamese military leader Truong Chinh argued that the militia or arming of the people was one of the most important means of mobilizing the people against the counter-revolutionary enemy. He wrote:

¹ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) 138.

² Marks, 137

³ Marks, 164.

⁴ Pushpa Kamal Dahal as quoted in Charles Haviland, "Meeting Nepal's Maoist Leader," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4707058.stm

We must arm the people, *launch the militia movement*. To launch the militia movement is the best means of mobilizing the entire people to take part in the fighting; it is a measure aimed at organizing and training a numerous reserve army to serve the regular army and to enable the latter to prolong the war.¹

A political connection is established between the revolutionary movement and the masses before the people are entrusted with arms. If the people are not politically mobilized or refuse to support the revolution they are not given weapons.

The counter-insurgency program, must similarly, establish a strong political bond with the people before citizen militias are formed. Citizen militias that are not politically connected and controlled by the counter-insurgency force can become an easy supply source of weaponry to the insurgency. Past experience has shown that insurgents have procured weapons from militias that were haphazardly thrown together by government forces or not politically connected to the government.

Citizen militias are often distrusted by governments. Niccolo Machiavelli was a staunch proponent of citizen militias. He argued,

...how little foundation there is for [the] conviction that such a citizen's militia, under the command of an aspiring subject or citizen, may deprive a prince or republic of his authority and dominions; for it is certain that no subjects or citizens, when legally armed and kept in due order by their masters, ever did the least mischief.²

Machiavelli's point is that a militia has to be governed by the rule of law and could be considered trustworthy once its political loyalty securely lies with the government. Citizen militias in the Philippines are subject to military law and regulations to dissuade human rights abuses and keep militia behavior in check.³

(5) THE CREATIVITY GAP AND EVANS CARLSON

In 1968, Colonel James Mrazek in *The Art of Winning Wars* came to the conclusion that soldiers are most creative when they are unconstrained by rigid military formulas and traditions. He argued that communist guerrillas had an advantage in that their training conditioned them to think outside of and beyond orthodox military thought. Recently, John Poole (a former USMC infantry officer) came to a similar conclusion. Poole argued that "Hezbollah and al-Qaeda trainers are not handcuffed by inane standardization and bureaucratic procedure."⁴ They are therefore more free to create new tactics that can challenge American military supremacy.

Poole argued that American infantrymen, "are conditioned to follow-to the letter of the law-squad tactics manuals that haven't significantly changed in 50 years." He further stated the

¹ Truong, 192

² Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Art of War* (New York: De Capo Press) 30.

³ Irineo C. Espino, "Counterinsurgency: The Role of Paramilitaries" (Monterey: Naval Post Graduate School Thesis, 2004) 36.

⁴ John Poole, *Tactics of the Crescent Moon* (Emerald Isle: Posterity Press, 2004) 234.

U.S. infantryman is not trained to fight as a guerrilla and therefore, "has a hard time thinking like one."¹

No American military unit in history has come closer to training its soldiers like revolutionary guerrillas than the famed 2nd Marine Raiders battalion formed in WWII. Evans Carlson, founder of the 2nd Raiders, traveled and lived with the Chinese Red Army for eighteen months as a military observer. Carlson incorporated Red Army political and military philosophy into the 2nd Raiders organizational structural and training regimen.

Carlson conducted extensive political training in the 2nd Raiders emulating Mao's maxim that every guerrilla must know the war's political goal. Carlson came to believe that a soldier's military prowess, initiative and motivation were directly related to his political mindset. A 1943 study of WWII psychiatric casualties noted that, "Carlson set out to train his men along lines opposed to the conventional outlines of U.S. military procedure. Perhaps more than any other American officer in this war, he has practiced his conviction that training must foster not stifle a soldier's individual initiative..."²

Carlson trained the Raiders to think on their own and to defeat the Japanese through superior tactics, not superior firepower. The 2nd Raiders would outfight the Japanese through a superior political mindset and tactical military innovation. The 2nd Raiders would not be bound by orthodox military training. Carlson was highly critical of the Japanese for constraining its men with rigid military doctrine. Carlson wrote, "And what of the Japanese army? It was not that the men lacked courage, for no man is braver on the field of battle than the Japanese. It was, rather, that the leaders lacked initiative and resourcefulness, and that the army had been trained to fight by rote."³

Carlson was critical of standard Marine Corps training in a speech given after the battle of Tarawa in 1943. He said:

Tarawa was won because a few enlisted men of great courage called out simply to their comrades, 'Come on, fellows. Follow me!' And then went on, followed by men who took heart at their example, to knock out, at great sacrifice, one Jap position after another, slowly, until there were no more. Tarawa is a victory because some enlisted men, unaffected by the loss of their officers, many of whom were casualties in the first hour, became great and heroic commanders in their own right.

But with all that courage and fortitude and willingness to die on the part of some of the men, too many others lacked initiative and resourcefulness. They were not trained to understand the need for sacrifice. Too many men waited for orders – and while they waited they died. What if they had been trained not to wait for orders?"⁴

¹ Poole, 234.

² "Psychiatric Toll of Warfare," *Fortune* 28, no. 6 (December 1943) 280 as sourced in Maj. Katherine Gomrick, "Gung-Ho Raider! The Philosophy and Methods Brig Gen Evans F. Carlson, Marine Corps Raider," (Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 1999) 36. <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA396537&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

³ Carlson, 27.

⁴ Evans Carlson, "Speech at Camp Pendleton on the Battle of Tarawa," December 1943

Carlson's premise in the second paragraph above follows the Maoist line that soldiers must be self-reliant and understand the political goal of the war. In Maoist thinking, a soldier's political motivation or willingness to fight for the war's political goal is a crucial factor in developing resourcefulness and initiative on the battlefield.

Carlson's emphasis on political training and indoctrination distinguishes the 2nd Raiders from other American special operations type units that have tended to concentrate on the military aspect of guerrilla warfare. Lieutenant General Samuel B. Griffith (USMC), translator of Mao's *On Guerrilla Warfare*, noted that:

In the United States, we go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerrillas do exactly the opposite. They go to great lengths to make sure that their men are politically educated and thoroughly aware of the issues at stake.¹

Griffith's words are not just a statement of fact but also a warning that politically energized guerrillas in a revolutionary warfare environment can defeat a superior but apolitical opponent. Griffith served as a language officer at the American embassy in China. He witnessed, with Carlson, the rise of the Red Army in China. Griffith served in the 1st Raiders battalion and knew Carlson personally. He was fully cognizant of the 2nd Raiders emphasis on Maoist style political and military training. Griffith may have been implying in his forward to *On Guerrilla Warfare* that American soldiers need to be politicized, just as the 2nd Raiders were, in order to understand and fight counter-revolutionary warfare.

(6) CONCLUSION

The United States faces a complex situation in the Middle East as it waits for the Iraqi people to spontaneously rise up and defeat the insurgents and the Iranian people to spontaneously rise up and overthrow their government. Political mobilization was the answer to the Red Army's problem of motivating a population that did not want to fight for itself. Political mobilization may be the answer to motivating the Iraqi and Iranian people to fight the insurgents and radicals that oppress them. As Mao said, "Bells don't ring till you strike them. Tables don't move till you shift them."

<http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWcarlson.htm>

¹ Samuel B. Griffith, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1961) 8.